* E. de Rougé thought that he had discovered, in a slightly damaged inscription bearing upon the Pûanît expedition, the mention of a tribute paid by the Lotanû. There is nothing in the passage cited but the mention of the usual annual dues paid by the chiefs of Pûanît and of the Ilîm.
** This is at least what may be inferred from the account of the campaign, where the Prince of Qodshû, a town of the Amaûru (Amorites), figures at the head of the coalition formed against Thûtmosis III.
*** This is the conclusion to be adopted from the beginning of the inscription of Thûtmosis III.: Now, during the duration of these same years, the country of the Lotanû was in discord until other times succeeded them, when the people who were in the town of Sharûhana, from the town of Yûrza, to the most distant regions of the earth, succeeded in making a revolt against his Majesty.
**** The account of this campaign has been preserved to us on a wall adjoining the granite sanctuary at Karnak.
The king left Gaza the following day, the 5th of Pakhons; he marched but slowly at first, following the usual caravan route, and despatching troops right and left to levy contributions on the cities of the Plain--Migdol, Yapu (Jaffa), Lotanû, Ono--and those within reach on the mountain spurs, or situated within the easily accessible wadys, such as Sauka (Socho), Hadid, and Harîlu. On the 16th day he had not proceeded further than Yahmu, where he received information which caused him to push quickly forward. The lord of Qodshû had formed an alliance with the Syrian princes on the borders of Naharaim, and had extorted from them promises of help; he had already gone so far as to summon contingents from the Upper Orontes, the Litany, and the Upper Jordan, and was concentrating them at Megiddo, where he proposed to stop the way of the invading army. Thûtmosis called together his principal officers, and having imparted the news to them, took counsel with them as to a plan of attack. Three alternative routes were open to him. The most direct approached the enemys position on the front, crossing Mount Carmel by the saddle now known as the Umm el-Fahm; but the great drawback attached to this route was its being so restricted that the troops would be forced to advance in too thin a file; and the head of the column would reach the plain and come into actual conflict with the enemy while the rear-guard would only be entering the defiles in the neighbourhood of Aluna. The second route bore a little to the east, crossing the mountains beyond Dutîna and reaching the plain near Taânach; but it offered the same disadvantages as the other. The third road ran north of _Zafîti_, to meet the great highway which cuts the hill-district of Nablûs, skirting the foot of Tabor near Jenîn, a little to the north of Megiddo. It was not so direct as the other two, but it was easier for troops, and the kings generals advised that it should be followed. The king was so incensed that he was tempted to attribute their prudence to cowardice. By my life! by the love that Râ hath for me, by the favour that I enjoy from my master Amon, by the perpetual youth of my nostril in life and power, My Majesty will go by the way of Aluna, and let him that will go by the roads of which ye have spoken, and let him that will follow My Majesty. What will be said among the vile enemies detested of Râ: Doth not His Majesty go by another way? For fear of us he gives us a wide berth, they will cry. The kings counsellors did not insist further. May thy father Amon of Thebes protect thee! they exclaimed; as for us, we will follow Thy Majesty whithersoever thou goest, as it befitteth a servant to follow his master. The word of command was given to the men; Thûtmosis himself led the vanguard, and the whole army, horsemen and foot-soldiers, followed in single file, wending their way through the thickets which covered the southern slopes of Mount Carmel.
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