Defeated in the field, and disappointed in his intention of saving Almeida, Massena sent orders to the Governor, General Brenier, to blow up the works, and retire with the garrison upon Barba de Puerco. Brenier having previously received instructions from Bessieres and from Berthier to prepare for thus evacuating the place, should it be necessary, had made 140 cavities ready to be charged before the end of April; but knowing that Massena would make every effort to retain possession of this fortress, which was the only fruit of his six months’ campaign in Portugal, he had prepared also for a vigorous defence, hoping to hold out till the first of June. The battle of Fuentes d’Onoro put an end to his hopes; for the firing was heard in Almeida, and proved that it was a serious action; and as the communication which he every moment expected did not arrive, Brenier could be in no doubt concerning the event. Massena’s orders reached him on the 7th. Immediately the cavities were filled, the balls and cartridges thrown into the ditch, and the artillery destroyed by discharging cannon into the mouths of the pieces. Two days were thus employed; on the morning of the 10th he assembled the officers, and having read to them his instructions, told them, that when the place was once demolished, the intentions of their sovereign would be perfectly fulfilled; that that single object ought to animate them; that they were Frenchmen and must now prove to the universe that they were worthy of being so. They continued to work in destroying stores and artillery, and completing the mines till the moment of their departure; and at ten at night, all being assembled with the greatest silence, Brenier gave as a watchword, Buonaparte and Bayard, and set off (in his own words) under the auspices of glory and honour. In coupling these names, he seems not to have felt how cutting a reproach they conveyed to every honourable Frenchman.
About one, the mines exploded; at the same time the garrison attacked the piquets which observed the place, and forced their way through them. They marched in two columns, fired as little as possible, and passed between the bodies of troops which had been posted to support the piquets. Brenier had studied the ground so well that he would not take a guide; a guide, he thought, would only make him hesitate and perhaps confuse him; the moon served as his compass, the different brooks and rivers which he crossed were so many points which insured his direction, and he placed his baggage at the tail of each column, in order that it might serve as a lure to the enemy, for to save it he knew was impossible. On the part of the blockading troops there was a culpable negligence; for as the garrison had frequently attacked the nearest piquets, and fired cannon in the night during the whole blockade, but more particularly while Massena was between the Duas Casas and the Azava, they thought this attack was nothing more than one of the ordinary sallies, and did not even move at the sound of the explosion, till its cause was ascertained. General Pack, however, who was at Malpartida, joined the piquets upon the first alarm with his wonted alacrity, and continued to follow and fire upon the enemy, as a guide for the march of the other troops. The 4th regiment, which was ordered to occupy Barba del Puerco, missed the way, and to this Brenier was chiefly indebted for his escape. Regnier was at the bridge of San Felices to receive him, and there he effected his junction, having lost, in this hazardous and well-executed escape, by the French official account, only sixty men. But the loss had been tenfold of what was there stated. For though the lure of the baggage was not thrown out in vain, and too many of his pursuers stopped or turned aside to secure their booty when the horses and mules were cast loose, he was followed and fired upon by General Pack’s party, and by a part of the 36th regiment, the whole way to the Agueda, 490 of his men were brought in prisoners, and the number of killed and wounded could not have been inconsiderable.