The ultimate strategical position of the United States in the Pacific cannot be forecasted until there is a clearer indication of how far she proposes to carry a policy of overseas expansion. But in the near future it can be seen that she will keep on the high seas one great Fleet, its central rallying point being probably Cuba, with the Galapagos Islands, San Francisco, Honolulu and Manila as the Pacific bases. At present the Galapagos belong to Ecuador, and Ecuador does not seem disposed to "lease" them to the United States. But that difficulty will probably be overcome, since the United States must have an advance guard to protect the Panama Canal on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic side. Viewed from a purely defensive standpoint, such a strategical position is sound and courageous. If offensive action is contemplated, on the Asiatic mainland for example, a military force far greater than that existing to-day in the United States must be created.
Japan has consolidated a sound strategical position by the annexation of Corea, Russian naval power having ceased to exist in the Pacific. Japan now holds the Sea of Japan as her own Narrow Water. The possibility of a hostile China making a sea attack can be viewed without dread, for naturally and artificially the Japanese naval position is very strong. Holding the Sea of Japan as securely as she does, Japan may also consider that her land frontier on the mainland is more accessible to her bases than to the bases of any possible enemy.
Russia has been harshly criticised for the conception of naval strategy which gave her one Fleet in the Baltic, another in the Black Sea, and a third in the Pacific. But she was forced by her geographical position into a "straggle" policy. It is extremely unlikely that she will now adopt the policy, recommended to her in some quarters, of concentrating naval strength in the Pacific: though, should the _Entente_ with Great Britain develop into an actual triple alliance between Great Britain, France and Russia, that concentration is just possible. It would have an important effect on the strategical position in the Pacific: but is too unlikely a contingency to call for any discussion. The same may be said in regard to any possibility of a great development of power in the Pacific by Germany or France.