M. J P, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:
We recognize and appreciate to the fullest extent the very great importance of this case, not only to the parties now before the court, but also to the great mass of the citizens of this country, all of whom are interested in the practical working of the courts of justice throughout the land, both Federal and state, and in the proper exercise of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, as limited and controlled by the Federal Constitution and the laws of Congress.
That there has been room for difference of opinion with regard to such limitations the reported cases in this court bear conclusive testimony. It cannot be stated that the case before us is entirely free from any possible doubt, nor that intelligent men may not differ as to the correct answer to the question we are called upon to decide.
The question of jurisdiction, whether of the circuit court or of this court, is frequently a delicate matter to deal with, and it is especially so in this case, where the material and most important objection to the jurisdiction of the circuit court is the assertion that the suit is, in effect, against one of the States of the Union. It is a question, however, which we are called upon, and which it is our duty to decide. Under these circumstances, the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, is most apposite. In that case he said: [p143]
Coming to a consideration of the case, we find that the complainants in the suit commenced in the circuit court were stockholders in the Northern Pacific Railway Company, and the reason for commencing it and making the railroad company one of the parties defendant is sufficiently set forth in the bill. Davis &c. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 220; Equity Rule 94, Supreme Court.
It is primarily asserted on the part of the petitioner that jurisdiction did not exist in the circuit court because there was not the requisite diversity of citizenship, and there was no question arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States to otherwise give jurisdiction to that court. There is no claim made here of jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship, and the claim, if made, would be unfounded in fact. If no other ground exists, then the order of the circuit court, assuming to punish petitioner for contempt, was an unlawful order, made by a court without jurisdiction. In such case this court, upon proper application, will discharge the person from imprisonment. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 485. But an examination of the record before us shows that there are Federal questions in this case.
It is insisted by the petitioner that there is no Federal ques- [p144] tion presented under the Fourteenth Amendment, because there is no dispute as to the meaning of the Constitution, where it provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; and whatever dispute there may be in this case is one of fact simply, whether the freight or passenger rates, as fixed by the legislature or by the railroad commission, are so low as to be confiscatory; and that is not a Federal question.
Jurisdiction is given to the circuit court in suits involving the requisite amount, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States (1 U.S. Comp. Stat., p. 508), and the question really to be determined under this objection is whether the acts of the legislature and the orders of the railroad commission, if enforced, would take property without due process of law; and although that question might incidentally involve a question of fact, its solution, nevertheless, is one which raises a Federal question. See Hastings v. Ames (C. C. App. 8th Circuit), 68 Fed. Rep. 726. The sufficiency of rates with reference to the Federal Constitution is a judicial question, and one over which Federal courts have jurisdiction by reason of its Federal nature. Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418; Reagan v. Farmers' &c. Co., ; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649; Covington &c Turnpike Road Company v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522; Chicago &c Railway Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U.S. 167, 172.