_Philosophie._ 'The thinges thanne,' quod she, 'that, whan men 70 doon hem, ne han no necessitee that men doon hem, eek tho same thinges, first or they ben doon, they ben to comen with-oute necessitee. For-why ther ben somme thinges to bityden, of which the endes and the bitydinges of hem ben absolut and quit of alle necessitee. For certes, I ne trowe nat that any man wolde seyn 75 this: that tho thinges that men doon now, that they ne weren to bityden first or they weren y-doon; and thilke same thinges, al-thogh that men had y-wist hem biforn, yit they han free bitydinges. For right as science of thinges present ne bringeth in no necessitee to thinges that men doon, right so the prescience of 80 thinges to comen ne bringeth in no necessitee to thinges to bityden. But thou mayst seyn, that of thilke same it is y-douted, as whether that of thilke thinges that ne han non issues and bitydinges necessaries, yif ther-of may ben any prescience; for certes, they semen to discorden. For thou wenest that, yif that 85 thinges ben y-seyn biforn, that necessitee folweth hem; and yif necessitee faileth hem, they ne mighten nat ben wist biforn, and that no-thing ne may ben comprehended by science but certein; and yif tho thinges that ne han no certein bitydinges ben purveyed as certein, it sholde ben dirknesse of opinioun, nat soothfastnesse 90 of science. And thou wenest that it be diverse fro the hoolnesse of science that any man sholde deme a thing to ben other-weys thanne it is it-self. And the cause of this erroure is, that of alle the thinges that every wight hath y-knowe, they wenen that tho thinges been y-knowe al-oonly by the strengthe and by the nature 95 of the thinges that ben y-wist or y-knowe; and it is al the contrarie. For al that ever is y-knowe, it is rather comprehended and knowen, nat after his strengthe and his nature, but after the facultee, _that is to seyn, the power and the nature_, of hem that knowen. And, for that this thing shal mowen shewen by a short 100 ensaumple: the same roundnesse of a body, other-weys the sighte of the eye knoweth it, and other-weyes the touchinge. The lokinge, by castinge of his bemes, waiteth and seeth from afer al the body to-gidere, with-oute moevinge of it-self; but the touchinge clyveth and conioineth to the rounde body, and moeveth aboute 105 the environinge, and comprehendeth by parties the roundnesse. And the man him-self, other-weys wit biholdeth him, and other-weys imaginacioun, and other-weys resoun, and other-weys intelligence. For the wit comprehendeth withoute-forth the figure of the body of the man that is establissed in the 110 matere subiect; but the imaginacioun comprehendeth only the figure withoute the matere. Resoun surmounteth imaginacioun, and comprehendeth by universal lokinge the comune spece that is in the singuler peces. But the eye of intelligence is heyere; for it surmounteth the environinge of the universitee, and looketh, 115 over that, by pure subtilitee of thoght, thilke same simple forme _of man that is perdurably in the divyne thoght_. In whiche this oughte greetly to ben considered, that the heyeste strengthe to comprehenden thinges enbraseth and contieneth the lowere strengthe; but the lowere strengthe ne aryseth nat in no manere 120 to heyere strengthe. For wit ne may no-thing comprehende out of matere, ne the imaginacioun ne loketh nat the universels speces, ne resoun taketh nat the simple forme _so as intelligence taketh it_; but intelligence, that looketh al aboven, whan it hath comprehended the forme, it knoweth and demeth alle the thinges 125 that ben under that forme. But _she knoweth hem_ in thilke manere in the whiche it comprehendeth thilke same simple forme that ne may never ben knowen to none of that other; _that is to seyn, to none of tho three forseide thinges of the sowle_. For it knoweth the universitee of resoun, and the figure of the imaginacioun, 130 and the sensible material _conceived by wit_; ne it ne useth nat nor of resoun ne of imaginacioun ne of wit withoute-forth; but it biholdeth alle thinges, so as I shal seye, by a strok of thought formely, _withoute discours or collacioun_. Certes resoun, whan it looketh any-thing universel, it ne useth nat of imaginacioun, nor 135 of witte, and algates yit it comprehendeth the thinges imaginable and sensible; for resoun is she that diffinisseth the universel of hir conseyte right thus:--man is a resonable two-foted beest. And how so that this knowinge is universel, yet nis ther no wight that ne woot wel that a man is a thing imaginable and sensible; and 140 this same considereth wel resoun; but that nis nat by imaginacioun nor by wit, but it looketh it by a resonable concepcioun.