“Nor is it possible to obtain scientific knowledge by way sense-perception. For even if sense-perception reveals a certain character in its object, yet we necessarily perceive _this_, _here_, and _now_. The universal, which is throughout all, it is impossible to perceive; for it is not a this-now; if it had been it would not have been universal, for what is always and everywhere we call universal. Since then demonstration (science) is universal, and such elements it is impossible to perceive by sense, it is plain that we cannot obtain scientific knowledge by way of sense. But it is clear that even if we had been able to perceive by sense [_e.g._ by measurement] that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, we should still have had to search for a demonstration, and should not, as some say, have known it scientifically (without one); for we necessarily perceive in particular cases only, but science comes by knowing the universal. Wherefore if we could have been on the moon, and seen the earth coming between it and the { 155} sun, we should not (by that mere perception) have _known_ the cause of the eclipse. Not but what by seeing this frequently happen we should have grasped the universal, and obtained a demonstration; for the universal becomes evident out of a plurality of particulars, and the universal is valuable because it reveals the cause;” and again, [2] “And that the search of science is for the middle term is made plain in those cases in which the middle term is perceptible to sense. For we search where we have had no perception,--as for the reason (or middle term) of an eclipse,--to know if there is a reason or not. But if we had been upon the moon, we should not have had to inquire if the process (of an eclipse as such, and not some other kind of darkness) takes place, or for what reason, but both would have been plain at once. The perception would have been, ‘The earth is now coming between,’ carrying with it the obvious fact, ‘The moon is now suffering an eclipse,’ and _out of this_ the universal (connection) would have arisen.”
[1] Aristotle, _An. Post._ 87, b. 28. [2] _Ibid._ 90, a. 24.
(_e_) I showed you a method on the way to this in the shape of Aristotle’s second figure, which we may call _analogy_. The plain sign of it is, that you give up counting the instances and begin to weigh them, so that the attributes which are predicates fall into the middle term or reason. In the former inference about influenza we did not suppose that you had any idea _why_ influenza was a serious illness; but in analogy there is some suggestion of this kind, so that the connection is examined into. Here at once you begin to get suggested explanations and confirmation from the { 156} system of knowledge. You cannot have analogy by merely counting attributes.