MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY dissenting.

I am obliged to dissent from the judgment of the court in this case. It hardly needs any reference to authorities to establish the familiar doctrines laid down in the opinion. As applied to ordinary cases of actions for malicious prosecution and arrest, they are elementary law. It cannot be gravely supposed that when the court below instructed the jury that the question of malice and probable cause was not before them except on the question of vindictive damages, it meant to ignore or to dispute the law as laid down by the court.

Stewart v. Sonneborn/Dissent Bradley

The question, as viewed by the court below, was not as to what is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove in an ordinary action for malicious prosecution, but whether the defendant in this particular case stood in the category that entitled him to require such proof.

Stewart v. Sonneborn/Dissent Bradley

No one doubts that in an ordinary action of this kind malice must be proved, and that probable cause for the prosecution is a defence. The sole question was whether this was such an ordinary action, or not; and this question has not been met by the counsel at the bar, and I do not think it is met in the opinion of the court.

Stewart v. Sonneborn/Dissent Bradley

What are the grounds and reasons for the stringent rules imposed upon a plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution? Why is he obliged to prove actual malice, and why is it that the defendant may justify by probable cause? The reason undoubtedly is, that every man in the community, if he has probable cause for prosecuting another, has a perfect right, by law, to institute such prosecution, subject only, in the case of private prosecutions, to the penalty of paying the costs if he fails in his suit. If this were not so, it would deter men from approaching the courts of justice for relief. Prosecutions may fail from many causes independent of the justice of the case; and it would be very hard to visit a man with heavy damages for making a complaint, or bringing a suit, when he had probable cause for it. Hence the law gives to every man a right to complain of or sue another, if he has probable cause to believe he has ground for such complaint or suit. For the exercise of this right he cannot be made accountable in damages, except so far as the law, for the discouragement of private suits, imposes upon him the costs of the litigation. In the case of criminal charges, this right of making complaint is given to every man, for all are interested in the preservation of public order. It is not necessary that the complainant or prosecutor should show any private interest in himself. But in the case of a civil suit, the prosecutor must base his demand upon some claim due, or supposed to be due, to himself. Without any claim, or pretence of claim, a suit brought in his own name, or in the name of another, would be of itself unlawful, malicious, and without probable cause.

In short, upon probable cause, every man has a right to bring a charge against another for a public offence; and every man supposing himself to be wronged by another, may bring suit for the redress of that wrong. The law gives this right, and protects it in an action brought for malicious prosecution or malicious arrest.

But suppose that, in any class of cases, the law did not give this right; could the party then stand, for his defence, upon the question of malice and probable cause? Most assuredly not. He could not bring himself within the proper category. He would then be liable, at all events, for the actual damage caused by an unjust prosecution; just as much so as the man who should assault and wound another, or take and carry away his goods. And if an action should be brought against him for such unjust prosecution, a charge of malice, or want of probable cause, introduced in the declaration, would, at most, be regarded as surplusage; or the prosecution would, per se, be regarded as malicious. The allegation of malice would no more prejudice the right of recovery than did similar allegations of fraud and intent to deceive and injure, in the old action of assumpsit. If a man does not bring himself within the category of right to sue given by the law, then it is clear that he cannot avail himself of the indulgence allowed by the law of showing probable cause for the suit.