Fliegerführer Atlantik (German: "Flyer Command Atlantic") was a World War II Luftwaffe naval air command dedicated to anti-maritime transport, anti-submarine, anti-surface enemy fleet, close air support Kriegsmarine for operations in the Atlantic Ocean, maritime interdiction, and maritime reconnaissance. The air command fought exclusively in the Battle of the Atlantic.

At the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Luftwaffe had few specialised naval aviation units and aircraft. By 1940, the Wehrmacht occupied much of Western Europe and Scandinavia. The Kriegsmarine (Navy) and its commander-in-chief Erich Raeder saw this as an opportunity to destroy the sea communications of the United Kingdom, Germany's last significant opponent in Europe.

Fliegerführer Atlantik

In February 1941, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) was ordered by Adolf Hitler to form a naval air command to support the Kriegsmarine's U-boat operations in the Battle of the Atlantic. Commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, agreed to the formation of the specialised naval command which remained under the operational control of the Luftwaffe and was subordinated to Luftflotte 3, commanded by Hugo Sperrle. The command had jurisdiction over all Luftwaffe operations in the Atlantic Ocean, English Channel and Irish Sea. The organisation's first commanding officer was Martin Harlinghausen.

Fliegerführer Atlantik

The command flew in action and achieved considerable success in 1941. Prime Minister Winston Churchill referred to Fliegerführer Atlantik and its main weapon of war, the Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor, as the "scourge of the Atlantic". At the close of the year British countermeasures tamed the threat from long-range German aircraft. As the battles in the Atlantic intensified in 1942 and 1943 the command made continuous demands for aircraft and crews. Heavily engaged in other theatres, the Luftwaffe could not afford to divert or create forces for Atlantic operations. Along with reconnaissance and anti-shipping operations, Fliegerführer Atlantik provided air superiority to cover U-boat transit routes in the Bay of Biscay against its contemporary, RAF Coastal Command.

Fliegerführer Atlantik

By 1944 Fliegerführer Atlantik had ceased to be effective. By April 1944 it had been disbanded and merged into Fliegerkorps X (10th Flying Corps). Throughout its existence, Kampfgeschwader 40 was the command's main combat unit.

Background

The Imperial German Navy () conducted successful aerial operations in the North Sea in World War I. The German Naval Air Corps () was successful in gaining air superiority and proved effective in anti-shipping operations. Despite battling bravely in the war the navy, unlike the German Army, lacked a major victory. The Army's success in contrast could be traced back to the Napoleonic Wars and there was a tradition in learning from past experiences. When the Reichsmarine was instituted by the Weimar Government (1919–1933), German naval officers were conscious of their wartime record and their status as the junior service. All of this contributed to the reluctance to undertake an examination of naval air operations. By 1921 the Reichsmarine had not made much progress in building a new air service. It possessed only 15 pilots.

Inter-service rivalry also hampered the development of German naval air doctrine. The Navy was unwilling to cooperate too closely with the army in aerial manoeuvres. The former Luftstreitkräfte (Air Service) officers, now employed in the army, knew that the naval staff had been the main opponents of the creation of an independent air arm and viewed the German Admiralty with suspicion. The navy resented the Luftstreitkräfte men in turn for their control of production and development of aircraft during the war. The German naval staff remained angered by the army's unwillingness to support naval logistics and the development of naval aviation requirements. Commander-in-chief of the Reichsmarine Admiral Hans Zenker was also wary of the Reichstag's attitude toward the navy. In the 1920s the very need for a German fleet of any kind was in question. Zenker was certain that if cooperation with the army was too close, the navy might be placed under army command.