On 11 September 2001 the world changed and rallied in the fight against the threat of terror that was common for all and had no boundaries. The world displayed an unprecedented solidarity by rejecting old phobia and stereotypes. It seemed that the global antiterrorist coalition had become a new reality that from then on would define the development of international relations which would be free from double standards and beneficial to all.
The coming together in the face of deadly threats coming from Al Qaeda and other elements of “terrorist internationale” made it possible to achieve tangible success at the first stage. After that, however, problems began to grow.
A painful blow to the unity of the antiterrorist coalition was delivered by the war in Iraq when – as it turned out later – under the false pretext of the fight on terror and nuclear arms proliferation international law was violated. In a wholly artificial way, the deepest crisis was created, and it is far from having been resolved so far.
More and more questions are being raised as to what is going on in Afghanistan. First and foremost, what is the acceptable price for losses among civilians in the ongoing antiterrorist operation? Who decides on criteria for determining the proportionality of the use of force? And why are the international contingents, which are present there, unwilling to engage in the combat against the proliferating drug threat that results in an ever increasing suffering to the countries of Central Asia and Europe?
These and other factors give reasons to believe that the anti-terrorism coalition is in the face of crisis. Looking at the core of the problem, it seems that this coalition lacks collective arrangements – i.e. equality among all its members in decision-making on the strategy and, especially, operational tactics. It so happens that in order to control a totally new situation as it evolved after 9/11, instead of the required genuine cooperative effort, including a joint analysis and coordination of practical steps, the mechanisms designed for a unipolar world started to be used, where all decisions were to be taken in a single center while the rest were merely to follow.
The solidarity of the international community fostered on the wave of struggle against terrorism turned out to be somehow “privatized”.
The inertia of the unipolar world ideology also revealed itself in other spheres of international life, including unilateral steps on AMD and militarization of outer space, attempts to bypass the parity in arms control regimes, expansion of politico-military blocs, and the politicization of issues of access to energy resources and their transport.
The illusion of a unipolar world confused many. For some people, it generated a desire to make an all-in stake on it. In exchange for total loyalty they expected to receive a carte blanche to resolve all their problems using any means. The emerging all-permissiveness syndrome that they developed went out of all possible control on the night of 8 August when the aggression was unleashed on South Ossetia. The bombing of the sleeping city of Tskhinval, the killing of civilians and peacekeepers trampled under foot all settlement agreements putting an end to Georgia’s territorial integrity.
Russia helped South Ossetia to repel this aggression, and discharged its duty to protect its citizens and fulfill its peacekeeping commitments. The recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia was the only possible step to be taken to ensure their security and the very survival of their people, taking into account the previous experience of the chauvinistic attitude of the Georgian leaders – starting with Georgian leader Z.Gamsakhurdia who, back in 1991, under the slogan of “Georgia for Georgians” ordered the deportation of Ossetians to Russia, abolished the autonomous status of South Ossetia and Abkhasia and later unleashed a bloody war. That time, an end was put to the war at the cost of innumerable human lives, and the peacekeeping and negotiation mechanisms were established with the approval of UN and OSCE. However, the current Georgian leadership pursued a persistent policy of undermining these mechanisms through continuous provocations, and finally trampled under foot the peace process by launching a new murderous war on the night of August 8.