We next come to the _Scurra_, a jester, of whom we find an illustration in ancient comedy. When the witnesses called by Agorastocles (in the ‘Pœnulus’ of Plautus) pompously order Collybiscus to walk in their rear, that personage remarks,

“Faciunt scurræ quod consuerunt; pone sese homines locant.”

The History of Court Fools — Part 22

“They act exactly like buffoons, who put every man behind them;” in which we see something of the ordinarily insolent character of these individuals.

The History of Court Fools — Part 22

Yet they are themselves said to have been originally the “followers” in the retinue of great men, and their name, Scurra, or _Sequura_, is derived by some lexicographers from ‘sequi,’ to follow. Their wit was sharp but polished, and to be scurrilous, in the olden time, was rather a credit than a disgrace; and if the enemies of Cicero called him the _scurra consularis_, it was not that they found his sarcasms coarse, but that they felt them penetrating and fatal.

The History of Court Fools — Part 22

The _Scurræ_, however, seem to have sunk to a level with the common buffoons, as we collect from the letter of Pliny to Genitor (l. ix. ep. 17). Pliny’s friend had written to him to express his disgust at a splendid entertainment where he had been a guest, being marred by the jokes, antics, and wiles of the professional _scurræ_, _cinædi_, and _moriones_. The difference between the first and the last who belonged to the profession of fools, consisted in this,--the Scurra professed the art of exciting his hearers to risibility by extravagant yet sparkling wit. The Morio worked more quietly, and as if he joked licentiously by natural disposition thereto. It is worthy of observation that Pliny rather chides his friend. He writes, substantially, in reply, “Pray smooth your brow. I do not hire such fellows myself, but I do not turn up my nose at those who follow a contrary fashion. There is nothing novel or grateful to me in the hackneyed gestures of the wanton, the pleasantry of the jester, or the nonsense of the fool.” And the philosopher adds, with great fairness, “You see it is not so much my judgment as my taste that is against them;” and, he says further, “When I have reading, music, or the company of an actor at my own house, there are some guests who leave directly, or who, if they stay, look as ‘glumpy’ at the diversions I provide, as you did at those which lately marred your entertainment. The truth is,” thus concludes the philosopher, and it is advice as valuable now as ever, “we should accept, as well-meant, the diversions provided for us by others, that they, in their turn, may be indulgent towards those we provide for them.” One thing noteworthy here is, that the sensible people in Rome did not really care for the “fool.” If the conquest of Scipio Asiaticus over Antiochus brought in that sort of entertainment, the _best_ philosophers (for some stooped to folly) protested against it by both precept and example.