[Footnote 20: The most apparent Reason for the Enemy's burning the _French_ Ship, was their concluding, that she must otherwise fall into our Hands, when our Men of War advanced to the Head of the Harbour; for they could apprehend little Danger to her from the Fire of _Castillo Grande_, as it lies only within a large random Shot from the Place, where she lay at Anchor.]
[Footnote 21: The Author of the Pamphlet in his Note (_y_) is pleased to affirm, "_That things were on this Occasion (as they had been throughout the whole) done without Order or Method; for notwithstanding the Army had been apprized of the Enemy's having made Lodgments along the Road; yet they landed without a Grenado Shell, or Field-Piece; and were likewise told the Road was even able to sustain the Weight of the heaviest Cannon_." Here the Author, as has been his Method thro' his whole Pamphlet, boldly asserts, without the least Foundation; for, it is evident, both from the Resolutions of Councils of War, and from publick Orders, that no Step was taken here, nor indeed upon any other Occasion, without a Plan first laid down; and (where Time would admit of it) well consider'd, and approved by a Council of War.
It is very certain, that when Mr. _Macpherson_, the Guide, was conducting the Troops thro' the Defillée, he expressed no little Uneasiness on the Account of Lodgments, which he apprehended we should find upon our Route; but nothing of that Sort appeared, excepting, that a few Bushes were placed, in Order, in an Opening upon our right Flank, possibly with a Design to cover some small Party, who had retired into the Wood. But had our Landing been postponed, till the Arrival of Ordnance Ships from the Mouth of the Harbour, the Field-Pieces, Granado-Shells, _&c._ which were then on board them, might indeed have been wanting to force such Works, as the Enemy would probably have finished during that Delay; which was prevented by boldly pushing thro' the Defillées to _La Quinta_; the Post of which, the Army was to possess themselves, "_for cutting off the Communication of the City with the Country, and for covering the Landing of the Artillery_". As Loss of Time might, on this Occasion, have been attended with the worst Consequences, the General found it necessary to advance without the _American_ Soldiers, Negroes, _&c._ which Disappointment cannot in any wise be attributed to the Officers of the Army, as the providing Boats for Landing the Forces was intirely under the Direction of the Navy.