Not unlike that condition which develops as the result of so-called psychic epilepsy, in which patients perform apparently voluntary acts, while the mind is really clouded by an epileptic attack, are those states in which, as the result of a more or less blind impulse, acts are performed for which the responsibility of the individual is at least dubious. Modern experts in nervous and mental diseases have sometimes spoken of these states as obsessions. This term is adopted from the older writers on mysticism who used it to designate states of mind in which an individual was under the influence of some spirit, though his intellectual and volitional state was not as completely under the subjection of this spirit as in the condition of possession.
It seems clear to the modern student of these obscure conditions that the old mystics and the modern alienists practically talk about the same state of affairs when using this term. As the result of obsession, mystical writers would have conceded that responsibility is not quite complete, though it is not entirely done away with. The modern alienist is just as sure of the diminution of responsibility, though he considers it due to the fact that for some physical reason the will is not able to act or prevent action as it is under normal conditions. The will is sometimes spoken of by certain of these modern psychologists as mainly an inhibitory faculty, that is, a faculty which prevents certain reflex acts from taking place, though permitting one set of reflexes to have its way. Under the influence of an obsession or, as the French call it, _une idée obsédante_, this inhibition is not { 267} exercised and as a result an action is accomplished which the agent may very shortly afterwards regret exceedingly.
There is no doubt that impulsions or impulsive ideas may push an individual into the performance of an action which his reason condemns. Uncontrollable anger is a well recognised example of this. Impulses of other kinds may exercise just as tyrannic a sway, though it is harder to recognise the elements that make up the mental condition in other cases. Of course it may well be said that man must control his impulses. It is, however, just such impulses as can not be controlled that lessen responsibility and sometimes seem entirely to destroy it. It would, without doubt, be very easy to advance the uncontrollable impulse as an excuse for many criminal actions. In fact, the discussion of responsibility and its limitation by impulse would seem to be open to so many abuses as to make it advisable, in the present indefinite state of our knowledge, to put the subject aside entirely. The argument, however, from the abuse of the thing, does not hold, and an effort must be made to get at the truth concerning certain mental conditions which modify responsibility.
