"it is true that in spite of the date of these instructions General Merritt in San Francisco had received no copy of them on August 28, three days after the departure of General Anderson, and what that officer knew of them could only have been what General Merritt remembered of the contents of an unsigned copy of them shown him at the White House, but they were in accordance with the practice of the United States Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice General Anderson well knew, and his relations with Aguinaldo were guided by it.
"It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers received the impression at this time from their conversation with American officers that the United States would undoubtedly recognize the independence of the Philippines, and that the cooperation of the insurgents was due to this impression. There was no cooperation. That he attempted in vain to secure the surrender of Manila to himself was not cooperation. That he refrained from attacking the Americans and occasionally permitted them to be furnished supplies, for which they paid, was not cooperation. The fact that for a time their plans and his plans were parallel does not mean cooperation. Aguinaldo was forced by the exigencies of the situation, by the necessity of strengthening his hold upon the people, by the necessities of his operations against the Spaniards, to make Spaniards and natives alike believe that all that he did was with the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported in all his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not obtain that he needed the appearance of their support for the attainment of his ends; and this he was forced to purchase by compliance, or apparent compliance, with their demands. But his compliance with them, as all American officers serving there well knew, was never willing, was never complete, and was never given except under pressure. It is true that writers upon the subject, speaking with the confidence which is born of insufficient and incomplete information, assure their readers that any government but that of the United States, any colonial administrators but Americans, would have been able to obtain the hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by judicious concessions to them at this time. The only concession which would have obtained that hearty cooperation would have been the recognition of the independence of the Philippines under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with the plenitude of the powers of the Katipúnan as dictator, and a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. This promise the Government of the United States could not make. Until the ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insurgents of the Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, and with them, except as fighting men, no relations could be had.