'The usual device of the Spencerian method consists in reconstructing evolution with the fragments of the evolved.... It is not however by dividing the evolved that we shall reach the principle of that which evolves. It is not by recomposing the evolved with itself that we shall reproduce the evolution of which it is the term.'[23]
But does Spencer ever suggest that we shall thus reach the principle of that which evolves--by which, if I mistake not, M. Bergson means the Source of evolution? Does he not urge that we can neither reach it in this way, nor in any other way? For M. Bergson, as for Spencer, it is unknowable by the intellect--it can only be known by what M. Bergson calls intuition. For both thinkers, the intellect provides only a world of symbols; and Spencer's transfigured realism may be matched by what Dr. Wildon Carr calls M. Bergson's transformed realism.[24] So long as we are dealing with the evolved--which is that with which alone science attempts to deal--Spencer, M. Bergson, and the rest of us are in like case. We must stumble on intellectually with our symbols as best we may. 'Whether we posit the present structure of mind or the present subdivision of matter in either case we remain in the evolved: we are told nothing of what evolves, nothing of evolution.'[25] _Nothing of what evolves!_ Spencer might exclaim with a groan. Have I then written all those pages and pages on the Unknowable for nought? Is it not a fundamental tenet of my philosophy that there must be, and therefore is, a Source of the evolved--of the phenomenal world which is merely an expression in terms of intellectual symbolism, of that ultimate Power which, though its nature may baffle the intellect, is none the less the most real of all realities?
It would take us too far from the line of Spencer's thought to consider M. Bergson's doctrine that it is the intellect that portions the world into lots;[26] that cuts the facts out of the interpenetrating whole of reality, and renders them artificially distinct within the continuity of becoming. It suffices to note that on such a presupposition 'the cardinal error of Spencer is to take experience already allotted as given, whereas the true problem is to know how the allotment was worked'.[27] I am not prepared to give--indeed I have been unable to find--M. Bergson's own solution of the problem. I gather that it was Life itself that somehow allotted concepts and objects in such correspondence as should be practically useful though metaphysically false and illusory. But just how it was done I have still to learn. 'The original activity was', we are told, 'a simple thing which became diversified through the very construction of mechanisms such as those of the brain,'[28] which, as Life's tool, has facilitated the chopping up of a continuous interpenetrating reality into mince-meat for intellectual assimilation. Such a conception was foreign to Spencer's thought. But some of us may find it hard to distinguish M. Bergson's 'original activity' from Spencer's Unknowable, which, so far as one can make out, somehow produced precisely the same results. As a matter of fact, M. Bergson seems to put into Life, as Spencer put into the Unknowable, the potentiality of producing all that actually exists.