Yet had they but considered the case of a being lower in the scale of space existence than themselves, they would have seen the answer to their riddle. For consider a being confined altogether to a line

Let M be the being, and let him observe the three points A B C, and let him form an idea of them and their positions with regard to each other, which he measures by the distance he has to travel to reach one after passing the other.

Scientific Romances (First Series) — Part 102

Let him also become aware of the three points A′ B′ C′, forming a precisely similar set on the other side of him.

Scientific Romances (First Series) — Part 102

It may be objected that the being in the line could not conceive any point lying beyond A, but that his experience would be limited to the points A and A′. If A and A′ are material particles this would be the case, but we may suppose them to be places in the line marked out by cold and heat, or some such means. Then a being could conceive a series of positions in his space such as A, B and C, A′, B′, C′.

Scientific Romances (First Series) — Part 102

If now he remembers each set, and thinks about them, he finds that they are alike in every respect. But he cannot make them coincide with each other. For if he pushes the set A B C along the line, when A B and A′ B′ are together C is just where it ought not to be. It is not on C′. And if he gets C on C′, then A B has gone far away.

He would neither be able to make them coincide nor to conceive their coincidence.

There would be no movement within the realm of his experience which would make them coincide.

Yet the dweller in a plane world could easily make these sets of points coincide, for he would bend the whole line round in his plane so that A coming on A′, B should come on B′, and C on C′. There would be no difficulty to him in doing this. And he does it in virtue of there being to him a movement possible which is not possible to the being in the line. He has a liberty of motion unknown to the linear being.

And now why should he not reason thus, “Something which to the linear being is inconceivable, to me is conceivable. Then may not things inconceivable to me be yet possible? May it not be possible that two triangles which are like one another, but yet which cannot be thought by me as coinciding—may not these triangles be able to be made coincident”?