2. _Best Evidence Rule._--Statements to the effect of the best evidence rule were often made by Chief Justice Holt about the beginning of the 18th century, and became familiar in the courts. Chief Baron Gilbert, in his book on evidence, which must have been written before 1726, says that "the first and most signal rule in relation to evidence is this, that a man must have the utmost evidence the nature of the fact is capable of." And in the great case of _Omichund_ v. _Barker_ (1744), Lord Hardwicke went so far as to say, "The judges and sages of the law have laid down that there is but one general rule of evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit" (1 Atkyns 49). It is no wonder that a rule thus solemnly stated should have found a prominent place in text-books on the law of evidence. But, apart from its application to documentary evidence, it does not seem to be more than a useful guiding principle which underlies, or may be used in support of, several rules.
It is to documentary evidence that the principle is usually applied, in the form of the narrower rule excluding, subject to exceptions, secondary evidence of the contents of a document where primary evidence is obtainable. In this form the rule is a rule of exclusion, but may be most conveniently dealt with in connexion with the special subject of documentary evidence. As noticed above, the general rule does not apply to the difference between direct and indirect evidence. And, doubtless on account of its vague character, it finds no place in Stephen's Digest.
3. _Hearsay._--The term "hearsay" primarily applies to what a witness has heard another person say in respect to a fact in dispute. But it is extended to any statement, whether reduced to writing or not, which is brought before the court, not by the author of the statement, but by a person to whose knowledge the statement has been brought. Thus the hearsay rule excludes statements, oral or written, made in the first instance by a person who is not called as a witness in the case. Historically this rule may be traced to the time when the functions of the witnesses were first distinguished from the functions of the jury, and when the witnesses were required by their formula to testify _de visu suo et auditu_, to state what they knew about facts from the direct evidence of their senses, not from the information of others. The rule excludes statements the effect of which is liable to be altered by the narrator, and which purport to have been made by persons who did not necessarily speak under the sanction of an oath, and whose accuracy or veracity is not tested by cross-examination. It is therefore of practical utility in shutting out many loose statements and much irresponsible gossip. On the other hand, it excludes statements which are of some value as evidence, and may indeed be the only available evidence. Thus, a statement has been excluded as hearsay, even though it can be proved that the author of the statement made it on oath, or that it was against his interest when he made it, or that he is prevented by insanity or other illness from giving evidence himself, or that he has left the country and disappeared, or that he is dead.