The CIA Tibetan program was an anti-Chinese covert operation spanning almost twenty years. It consisted of "political action, propaganda, paramilitary and intelligence operations" facilitated by arrangements made with brothers of the 14th Dalai Lama, who himself was not initially aware of them. The stated goal of the program was "to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among several foreign nations". The program was admininstrated by the CIA, and unofficially operated in coordination with domestic agencies such as the Department of State and the Department of Defense.
Previous operations had aimed to strengthen various isolated Tibetan resistance groups, which eventually led to the creation of a paramilitary force on the Nepalese border consisting of approximately 2,000 men. By February 1964, the projected annual cost for all CIA Tibetan operations had exceeded US$1.7 million.
The program ended after President Nixon visited China to establish closer relations in 1972. The Dalai Lama criticised the cessation of the program, declaring that this proved that there were ulterior motives than helping the Tibetan people.
Overview
In the fields of political action and propaganda, the CIA's Tibetan program was aimed at lessening the influence, capabilities, and territorial scope of the Government of China. Particularly, the United States feared communist involvement in the region. A 1957 report on logistical issues indicated increasing trepidation that the Chinese would escalate their communist presence in Tibet. The spread of communism in the international community was a huge concern for the United States. The CIA considered China's interest in Tibet to be a threat for multiple reasons. A 1950 memorandum noted that some of the reasons stemmed from a notion of bolstered sovereignty and a motivation to forge "a bulwark against possible invasion by western powers via India." However, they also believed that China would "use [Tibet as] a base for attacks against India and the Middle East in the third world war." Therefore, intelligence officials declared action as a preventative measure should their worst-case scenario (WWIII) unfold.
The approval and subsequent endorsement of the program was carried out by the Special Group of the United States National Security Council. The program consisted of several clandestine operations bearing the following code names:
ST CIRCUS—Cover name for the training of Tibetan guerillas on the island of Saipan, and at Camp Hale in Colorado ST BARNUM—Cover name for the airlifting of CIA agents, military supplies, and support equipment into Tibet. ST BAILEY—Cover name for a classified propaganda campaign Chinese-Indian relations also played an important role in framing the CIA's operations. Due to Tibet's geographic location between the two countries, it was strategically important. The CIA released numerous reports assessing relations. The CIA monitored the relations between China and India in various ways, including media such as newspapers and radio broadcasts that reported on the changing relations between India and China. In October 1954, for example, a report was filed by CIA analysts concerning Indian Prime Minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to China. It assessed what the two countries might or might not agree to from a diplomatic standpoint. Following the month-long Sino-Indian War of 1962, the CIA developed a close relationship with Indian foreign intelligence services in both training and supplying agents in Tibet.
The CIA worked to strengthen the Tibetans against the Chinese communist efforts. To do so, the United States planned to issue asylum to the Dalai Lama and his supporters. Some resistance fighters took their own lives when captured by the Chinese to avoid torture. The Tibetan resistance was promised weaponry and resources from the West to continue their resistance against the Chinese. Knowing resistance was unlikely to succeed the resistance accepted Chinese annexation.