The original version of this article, written by Anne Vigna, was published by Agência Pública's website [pt], on 1 April 2014, the 50th anniversary of the military coup in Brazil. All links lead to websites in English unless otherwise stated. The interview with Paul Aussaresses, published in the 23 November 2000 issue of Le Monde [fr], had an explosive impact in France and Algeria. For many years, historians and journalists had been searching for a soldier's testimony about the methods used by the French against militants from the National Liberation Front (FLN) during the Algerian War of Independence (1955-1962). Aussaresses, aged 82 at the time of the interview, admitted to torture and covering up murders, executions and death squads. He claimed to have no regrets. By the time of his death [pt] in December 2013, he had never revealed the identities of the members of his death squads. Aussaresses was considered to be one of France's most skilled officials in counter-insurgency. For many years, Aussaresses's activities remained a mystery, with little known about his participation in the perpetration of the Brazilian military dictatorship and France's activities during that period. Then Rodrigo Nabuco, a historian originally from Rio de Janeiro who has lived in France for many years, began to delve into French government documents to bring to light the voice of the “executioner of Algiers” and his accounts of the time he spent time in South America. Nabuco's thesis [pt] “Conquering minds and trading weapons: French military diplomacy in Brazil” – the reports of the military attachés kept secret for 30 years in the French embassy. The general in command Aussaresses was considered one of France's most skilled officials in counter-insurgency. Trained in intelligence techniques in London during World War II, he became commander of the parachute brigade 11e Choc, the military arm of the French secret services overseas. Years later, in his first book [fr] of memoirs published in 2001, he clearly explained his mission: Fazer o que chamávamos “guerra psicológica” [pt], em todos os lugares que fosse necessário, como na Indochina. Preparava meus homens para realizar operações clandestinas, colocação de bombas, ações de sabotagem ou a eliminação de inimigos. To carry out what we called “psychological warfare“, in any place in which it was necessary, such as Indochina. I prepared my men to undertake clandestine operations, to place bombs, and to engage in acts of sabotage or elimination of the enemy. Three years after France's defeat in Vietnam in 1957-58, French troops were victorious in the Battle of Algiers. Aussaresses played a vital role in the French parachutists’ victory, divided into operational zones and acting on “intelligence” – from the encirclement of targets to torture, executions and massacres that resulted in the “disappearances” of 4,000 people. Algeria ended up winning independence in 1962, but France's experience of anti-guerilla warfare made them specialists in “revolutionary warfare” at a time when the United States was entering Vietnam. France promoted its military doctrine to its allies in the Cold War through magazines, books and courses led by Aussaresses himself in the United States. There, his influence remained. The 1956 film “The Battle of Algiers”, in which Italian filmmaker Gillo Pontecorvo denounces French troops’ killing, torture and lies – and which Aussaresses considered “marvellous, very true to reality” – was even shown in the Pentagon [pt]. Brazil, 11 September 1973 Admired around the world, with the profile of a soldier trained for torture and execution, the general appeared the ideal candidate to arrange the Pompidou government's diplomatic mission in Brazil during the ‘years of lead’. In his first reports from Brazil, Aussaresses recounts coming into contact with former pupils from his US courses. They “resulted in friendly contacts from a personal point of view but which were also useful for the services”, he wrote [fr]. He felt at home in the company of his friend, the general and future president João Batista Figueiredo, about to take on the leadership of the SNI (National Intelligence Service) in the Geisel government (1974). He was also close to the police deputy Sérgio Fleury, a torturer symbolic of the Brazilian dictatorship – he even mentioned him in his second book of memoirs “I haven't said everything yet” (“Je n’ai pas tout dit” [fr], in French, 2008) as head of the death squad.