36. This conclusion does not seem consistent with his starting-point, according to which men are 'naturally enemies'
37. From such a 'status naturalis' there is no possible transition to the 'status civilis,' and the phrase '_jus_ naturae' remains unmeaning
38. Spinoza's error of regarding 'rights' as possible apart from society was confirmed by his denial of final causes
39. It was just because Plato and Aristotle regarded man as finding his end in the end of the state, that they founded a true theory of rights
40. Spinoza, however, while insisting that man is 'part of nature,' yet places his 'good' in understanding nature and so acquiring a new character
41. In thus recognising the idea of perfection as a determinant of life, he really recognises an operative final cause, though without seeing its bearing on the theory of right.
42. Hobbes differs from Spinoza in regarding the right of the sovereign, not as limited by his power, but as absolute
44. He uses 'person,' as in Roman law, for either (1) a complex of rights, or (2) the subject of those rights
45. Though by his theory the sovereign may be one or many, and sovereignty is transferable by the act of a majority, he tacitly vindicates the absolute right of a _de facto_ monarchy
46. The radical fiction in his theory is that there can be any 'right' _after_ the institution of sovereignty, if (as he holds) there is none before it
47. To justify his doctrine of absolute submission he has to assume a 'law of nature' which binds men to keep covenant, while yet he holds the 'law of nature' to be mere 'power' and covenants to be only valid under an _imperium,_
48. His 'contract' can confer none but natural right, and that is either not a right at all, or (if it is) it belongs to all men, subject and sovereign alike
49. The real flaw in the theory of contract is not that it is unhistorical, but that it implies the possibility of rights and obligations independently of society
50. Though it has not been popularly accepted as regards the rights of sovereigns over subjects, the behaviour of individuals to society is to a groat extent practically determined by it.
51. The development of this latter side of it is peculiarly due to Rousseau, but Locke, Hooker, and Grotius have essentially the same conception: Spinoza alone differs