[Footnote 27: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139 B.
[Greek: Kai\ mê\n du/o ge u(penanti/a e(ni\ pra/gmati pô=s a)\n ei)/ê?]
That each thing has one opposite, and no more, is asserted in the Protagoras also, p. 192-193.]
[Footnote 28: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139-140 A-B.
[Greek: Kai\ ga\r oi( pure/ttontes pa/ntes nosou=sin, ou) me/nntoioi( nosou=ntes pa/ntes pure/ttousin ou)de\ podagrô=sin ou)de/ ge o)phthalmiô=sin; a)lla\ no/sos me\n pa=n to\ toiou=to/n e)sti, diaphe/rein de/ phasin ou(\s dê\ kalou=men i)atros tê\n a)pergasi/an au)tô=n; ou) ga\r pa=sai ou)/te o(/moiai ou)/te o(moi/ôs diapra/ttontai, a)lla\ kata\ tê\n au)tê=s du/namin e(ka/stê.]]
[Side-note: Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar.]
(We may remark that Plato here, as in the Euthyphron, brings under especial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal logic--that between a generic between a term and the various specific terms comprehended under it. Possessing as yet no technical language for characterising this distinction, he makes it understood by an induction of several separate but analogous cases. Because the distinction is familiar now to instructed men, we must not suppose that it was familiar then.)
[Side-note: Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance.]
_Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man, he who knows what it is proper to say and do--and the unwise man, he who does not know? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--The unwise man will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or done? Though not mad like Oedipus, he will nevertheless pray to the Gods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for example, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you should become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece. _Alk._--Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I do. _Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life, or to damage yourself by the employment of it? _Alk._--Not on those conditions.[29] _Sokr._--But you are aware that many ambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the man who just now killed the Macedonian King Archelaus, and usurped his throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be envied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to ruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that they may become fathers; but discover presently that their children are the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves again childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually happening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed benefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see that it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered to you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.[30] _Alk._--I see now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head.