20. But haply some may think

that there is an exception to be added; that there be some honest

lies which not only hurt no man, but profit some man, excepting

those by which crimes are screened and defended: so that the reason

why the aforesaid lie is disgraceful, is that, although it hurt no

man, and profit the poor, it screens a theft; but if it should in

such sort hurt nobody and profit somebody as not to screen and

defend any sin, it would not be morally wrong. As, put the case

that some one should in thy sight hide his money that he might not

lose it by theft or violence, and thereupon being questioned thou

shouldest tell a lie; thou wouldest hurt no man, and wouldest serve

him who had need that his money were hidden, and wouldest not have

covered a sin by telling a lie. For it is no sin if a man hide his

property which he fears to lose. But, if we therefore sin not in

telling a lie, for that, while covering no man’s sin, we hurt

nobody and do good to somebody, what are we about as concerning the

sin itself of a lie? For where it is laid down, “Thou shalt not

steal,” there is also this, “Thou shall not bear false

witness.” Since then

each is severally prohibited, why is false witness culpable if it

cover a theft or any other sin, but if without any screening of sin

it be done by itself, then not culpable, whereas stealing is

culpable in and by itself, and so other sins? Or is it so that to

hide a sin is not lawful; to do it, lawful?

Footnotes

Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume III/Moral Treatises of St. Augustin/On Lying/Section 20