(M11) We see the house itself, the church itself; it being an idea and nothing more. The house itself, the church itself, is an idea, i.e. an object--immediate object--of thought(54).

Instead of injuring, our doctrine much benefits geometry.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4. — Part 50

(M12) Existence is percipi, or percipere, [or velle, i.e. agere(55)]. The horse is in the stable, the books are in the study as before.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4. — Part 50

(M13) In physiques I have a vast view of things soluble hereby, but have not leisure.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4. — Part 50

(M14) Hyps and such like unaccountable things confirm my doctrine.

Angle not well defined. See Pardies' Geometry, by Harris, &c. This one ground of trifling.

(M15) One idea not the cause of another--one power not the cause of another. The cause of all natural things is onely God. Hence trifling to enquire after second causes. This doctrine gives a most suitable idea of the Divinity(56).

(M16) Absurd to study astronomy and other the like doctrines as speculative sciences.

(M17) The absurd account of memory by the brain, &c. makes for me.

How was light created before man? Even so were Bodies created before man(57).

(M18) Impossible anything besides that wch thinks and is thought on should exist(58).

That wch is visible cannot be made up of invisible things.

M.S. is that wherein there are not contain'd distinguishable sensible parts. Now how can that wch hath not sensible parts be divided into sensible parts? If you say it may be divided into insensible parts, I say these are nothings.

Extension abstract from sensible qualities is no sensation, I grant; but then there is no such idea, as any one may try(59). There is onely a considering the number of points without the sort of them, & this makes more for me, since it must be in a considering thing.

Mem. Before I have shewn the distinction between visible & tangible extension, I must not mention them as distinct. I must not mention M. T. & M. V., but in general M. S., &c.(60)

Qu. whether a M. V. be of any colour? a M. T. of any tangible quality?

If visible extension be the object of geometry, 'tis that which is survey'd by the optique axis.

(M19) I may say the pain is _in_ my finger, &c., according to my doctrine(61).

Mem. Nicely to discuss wt is meant when we say a line consists of a certain number of inches or points, &c.; a circle of a certain number of square inches, points, &c. Certainly we may think of a circle, or have its idea in our mind, without thinking of points or square inches, &c.; whereas it should seem the idea of a circle is not made up of the ideas of points, square inches, &c.