Precisely as the position of Japan on the Asiatic mainland was the result of arbitrament by the sword, drawn in response to a challenge made by others, and is now upheld by the prestige of arms, her Asiatic policy, although conceived in self-defense, came to assume in the eyes of the outside world a semblance of military aggrandizement. As a consequence, Japan is looked upon as a militaristic nation, bent upon conquest. Suspicion and fear are thereby engendered. This is, to say the least, extremely unfortunate. No stone should be left unturned to smooth the sharp edges cut by this historical retrospect and to obliterate the unpleasant memories of the past. No effort would be too great for Japan to convince the world of her genuine faith that her future lies "not in territorial and military conquest, but on the water in the carrying trade and on land in her commercial and industrial expansion abroad." Her erstwhile failure to dispel the suspicion of the world about her intentions and to take it into her confidence is the root of many ills with which she has been afflicted for the past few years.
The storm of criticism we have witnessed in America about the Shantung settlement is a good illustration. Whatever part party politics in the United States may have played in raising the furor, had Japan secured the complete confidence of the American people, all the eloquence expended for the denunciation of the Shantung clause in the Versailles Treaty would surely have fallen on deaf ears. That our judgment is not wrong is sustained by the fact that the Portsmouth Treaty evoked not a word of protest in America. We need not remind our readers that the Treaty concluded through the good offices of President Roosevelt and the settlement made at Versailles are not only based upon the same principles but are exactly identical in many respects, with this most important exception--namely, that the former Treaty transferred to Japan the lease of the Kwantung territory, and she still holds it, while in the latter case she pledges herself to relinquish the leasehold of Kiaochow, thereby restoring the complete sovereignty of China over Shantung, which had been infringed upon by Germany. The Shantung settlement is, consequently, of a far greater advantage to China. What Japan secures in that province is only the same economic rights and privileges which are enjoyed by other Powers in other parts of China. There is, therefore, no justifiable ground for singling out Japan for attack with regard to the international arrangement now in vogue in China. Were the complete reconstruction of China, the re-writing of her history, to be attempted, international justice would demand that the parties interested should all share equal responsibilities and sacrifices. Discrimination against Japan alone is unjust, unfair. The would-be builders of the new heaven and the new earth can ill afford to lay the cornerstone of their edifice on such an unsafe and unlevel ground. Manifestly, the dawn of the millennium is still far away. We have to make the best of the world as it is. To ignore this fact is to make the confusion in the world worse confounded. As a result of this misapprehension of history, the Shantung question still remains in abeyance, because of China's refusal to enter into negotiations with Japan for the restoration of Kiaochow, thus delaying perfect accord between the two Oriental neighbors whom destiny has called to be on the best of terms. The foregoing interpretation of the Shantung question could not in ordinary circumstances have failed to convince the practical American people of the appropriateness of the Versailles settlement, were they not tempted to indulge suspicions of Japan and, hence, ready to be easily misled by false stories, misrepresentations, and slanders concocted by her enemies.