Major General (Ret) Basuki Rahmat (4 November 1921 – 8 January 1969) was an Indonesian general, National Hero and a witness to the signing of the Supersemar document transferring power from President Sukarno to General Suharto.
Early life
Basuki Rahmat was born on 4 November 1921 in Tuban, East Java. His father, Raden Soedarsono Soenodihardjo, was assistant to a local district chief. His mother, Soeratni, died in January 1925 when Basuki was only four years old, ten days after giving birth to his brother. When he was seven, Basuki was sent to elementary school. In 1932 his father died, resulting in a temporary halt to Basuki's education. He was sent to live with his paternal aunt and finished his education, graduating from junior high school in 1939 and from the Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah school in 1942, just as the Japanese invasion of Indonesia started.
Military career
In 1943, during the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies, Basuki joined the Defenders of the Motherland Army (PETA), an auxiliary force ran by the Japanese to train extra soldiers in the case of an allied invasion of Java. In PETA, Basuki rose to become a company commander.
With the Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945 by Nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, Basuki, like many other youths began to band into militias in preparation for the formation of an Indonesian Army. On 5 October 1945, the People's Security Armed Forces (TKR) was formed, with Basuki enlisting with TKR on the same month at the town of Ngawi in his native province of East Java. There he was stationed with KODAM VII/Brawijaya (then known as Military Territory V/Brawijaya), the military command charged with the security of East Java.
At this Kodam, Basuki served as a battalion commander at Ngawi (1945–1946), battalion commander at Ronggolawe (1946–1950), regimental commander stationed at Bojonegoro (1950–1953), chief of staff to the commander of Military Territory V/Brawijaya (1953–1956) and acting commander of Military Territory V/Brawijaya (1956).
In September 1956, Basuki was transferred to Melbourne, Australia to serve as a military attache to the embassy there. Basuki returned to Indonesia in November 1959 and served as Assistant IV/Logistics to Army Chief of Staff Abdul Haris Nasution.
Basuki returned to KODAM VII/Brawijaya in 1960, serving as chief of staff before finally becoming regional commanding general in 1962.
G30S and murder of generals
By 1965, there was a great deal of political tension in Indonesia, especially between the Army and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The PKI, which had slowly been slowly gaining a footing in Indonesian politics, was now set to become the most powerful political party because of their association with President Sukarno. In September 1965, Basuki grew wary of communist activities in East Java and went to Jakarta to report his observations to the Commander of the Army, Ahmad Yani. They met on the evening of 30 September when Basuki met with Yani and reported of the goings on in his province. Yani complimented Basuki on the report and wanted him to accompany him to his meeting with the president the following morning to relay his story of Communist activities.
The next morning on 1 October, Basuki was contacted by the Army Headquarters and notified of the kidnapping of the generals, including Yani, whom he had expected to be back in the palace as promised but ended up dead in his house. Hearing this, Basuki together with an aide went in a car and took a drive around the city to check what was going on. As he was driving, Basuki noticed his troops from East Java, the 530th Infantry Battalion guarding the Presidential Palace and was even more surprised that they were not wearing any divisional patches nor rank insignia. After being advised against approaching them by his aide, Basuki drove back to his accommodation where he was informed that he was needed at the Kostrad headquarters.
Basuki went to the Kostrad headquarters to find that the commander of Kostrad, Major General Suharto, had decided to assume the leadership of the Army and take control of the situation. From Suharto, Basuki found out that a movement calling themselves the 30 September Movement had used the troops to occupy strategic points in Jakarta. Suharto then told Basuki that he needed him to negotiate the troops into surrendering before 6 pm or else he would use force. This, Basuki conveyed to the 530th Battalion who treated him with the utmost respect. Basuki was successful and by 4 pm, the 530th Battalion, in the presence of Kostrad forces, surrendered.