"(2) In the event of the said Bill being duly accepted or approved of by the majority of the voters on the said roll who shall vote when a poll is taken, and upon a certificate to that effect to be duly given by the Speaker, the said Bill shall be transmitted to the Governor for his assent. Should, however, such Bill be rejected or disapproved of, then, upon the certificate of the Speaker to that effect, the said Bill shall lapse for the session.
"(3) At least six weeks must intervene between the first and the second passing of the said Bill by the Legislative Assembly."
Measures based upon these lines were introduced during 1896 in the Assemblies of Victoria, Tasmania, and New South Wales, but, in the latter case alone, reached the Legislative Council. It was thought that that body might receive the Bill favourably, as it would be brought thereby into direct contact with the people, and might overcome the jealousy which is at present felt against it. In fact, it might attain to actual popularity by enabling the electorate to pronounce directly upon a distinct issue. But this view did not prevail with the Council, which rejected the measure in the most summary manner.
A supplementary proposal put forward in Victoria { 131} is that, upon subjects which cannot be referred in a clear and simple manner to the electors, differences should be followed by a dissolution of both Houses, and, if an agreement is still impossible, by their joint meeting as one Chamber. In New Zealand, a Bill recently introduced by the Premier, but not passed through the House of Representatives, provided that, if a measure had been twice within fourteen months passed by one House and rejected by the other, the House which had passed it might call upon the Governor to convene a joint meeting of the two Houses, which should finally dispose of it by approval, rejection, or amendment. It will be noticed that the Council might thus secure the enactment of a measure which was opposed by the majority of the popular representatives.
The antagonism of the two Houses in Victoria would seem to be to a great extent a reflex of an antagonism between town and country. The population of the Province is estimated to have been 1,180,000 in 1895, that of Melbourne and its suburbs 439,000, or 37 per cent. of the whole. Under these conditions, and owing to the greater cohesion of compact electorates, a strong feeling has arisen in the rural districts that Melbourne has a disproportionate voice in the affairs of the Province, and that the balance should be redressed by the action of the Council. It is also believed that the abolition of the plural vote would lead to equal electoral districts which would increase the supremacy of the capital { 132} and the power of the Labour Party. At the present time they hold fifteen seats, all of which are urban or suburban, and, though discredited by the collapse of the Trades Unions, are not without influence upon the Government.