“After the fall of the second objective, the advance ceased for some unexplained reason--(they were told some hitch about Flesquières)--the attack seemed to lose purpose and direction. Tanks on the flanks began coming back. The battalion was ordered to attack five different objectives, and before the necessary plans could be communicated to subordinate commanders, orders were received cancelling the previous instructions. In a word, chaos prevailed. The afore-mentioned subaltern cannot speak too highly of the work of the tank commanders--nothing could exceed their daring and enterprise. He says he is absolutely convinced that infantry, unsupported by artillery, are absolutely powerless against tanks and that no belt of wire can be built through which they cannot break an admirable passage for infantry.
“Lastly, he makes no secret of the fact that it would demand the utmost exercise of his determination and resolution to stand fast and hold his ground in the face of an attack by enemy tanks, carried out on the same scale as ours. I may add that he is a big upstanding fellow, a fine athlete, and afraid of nothing on two legs.
“I give you his opinion at some length, because they are the _ipsissima verba_ of a man qualified to speak from personal practical experience. Personally, I believe the tanks may yet play the biggest rôle in the war, if only the Higher Command will employ them in situations where common-sense and past experience alike demand their use. Two days before the Hun attacked us at Bourlon wood we lost three officers and some seventy gallant fellows trying to mop up a couple of enemy M.G. nests--a bit of work a couple of tanks could have done _with certainty_ without the loss of a man.
“In the situation described after the capture of the second objective, why should there not have been a responsible staff officer--G.S.O.1 say--right forward in a tank to size up the situation and seize opportunity, the very essence of which is rapid decision? In the early days of the war, forgetful of the lessons of South Africa, we put our senior officers in the forefront of the battle--of late, the pendulum has swung the other way--surely the employment of a tank for the purpose outlined would enable us now to strike the happy mean?