The question for decision is whether a seaman injured on shore while in the service of his vessel is entitled to recover for his injuries in a suit brought against his employer under the Jones Act. § 33 Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688.

Petitioner was a deckhand on respondent's vessel 'Michigan', engaged in transporting sand from Indiana to Illinois over the navigable waters of Lake Michigan. As her cargo was being discharged through a conduit passing from the hatch and connected at its outer end to a land pipe by means of a gasket, petitioner was ordered by the master to go ashore to assist in repair of the gasket connection. While he was so engaged the alleged negligence of a fellow employee caused a heavy counterweight, used to support the gasket, to fall on petitioner and cause the injuries of which he complains. The district court dismissed the cause of action under the Jones Act and granted an award for wages. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit modified the judgment, 127 F.2d 901, by allowing an additional award for maintenance and cure, but held that no recovery could be had under the Jones Act for injury to a seaman not occurring on navigable waters. We granted certiorari, 317 U.S. 611, 63 S.Ct. 62, 87 L.Ed. --, the question being one of importance in the application of the Jones Act.

O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company/Opinion of the Court

The Jones Act, so far as presently relevant, provides:

O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company/Opinion of the Court

'Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply * * *.'

O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company/Opinion of the Court

The Act thus made applicable to seamen injured in the course of their employment the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60, which gives to railroad employees a right of recovery for injuries resulting from the negligence of their employer, its agents or employees. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S.Ct. 391, 68 L.Ed. 748; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 56 S.Ct. 707, 80 L.Ed. 1075. The term 'seamen' has been interpreted to embrace those employed on a vessel in rendering the services customarily performed by seamen, including stevedores while temporarily engaged in stowing cargo on the vessel. International Stevedore Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19, 71 L.Ed. 157; Buzynski v. Luckenbach S.S.C.o., 277 U.S. 226, 48 S.Ct. 440, 72 L.Ed. 860. There is nothing in the legislative history of the Jones Act to indicate that its words 'in the course of his employment' do not mean what they say or that they were intended to be restricted to injuries occurring on navigable waters. On the contrary it seems plain that in taking over the principles of recovery already established for railroad employees and extending them in the new admiralty setting (see The Arizona v. Anelich, supra) to any seaman injured 'in the course of his employment', Congress, in the absence of any indication of a different purpose, must be taken to have intended to make them applicable so far as the words and the Constitution permit, and to have given to them the full support of all the constitutional power it possessed. Hence the Act allows the recovery sought unless the Constitution forbids it.