This is another case in which we must define the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. The precise question is whether petitioners who are engaged in maintaining or operating a toll road and a drawbridge over a navigable waterway which together constitute a medium for the interstate movement of goods and persons are 'engaged in commerce' within the meaning of §§ 6 and 7 of the Act.
Petitioners, together with others not parties to this petition, brought this action against respondent and a subsidiary under § 16(b) of the Act for the recovery of unpaid minimum wages, overtime compensation, and liquidated damages. Respondent moved to dismiss as to all the plaintiffs, and the motion as to petitioners was granted by the district court, leave to amend being given to the other complainants who are not before us. D.C., 43 F.Supp. 445. Petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of dismissal. 5 Cir., 128 F.2d 450. The important question raised as to the coverage of the Act caused us to grant certiorari. 317 U.S. 606, 63 S.Ct. 56, 87 L.Ed. --.
The relevant facts alleged in the complaint as amended, which are to be taken as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss, may be summarized as follows:
Respondent owns and operates a toll road and a drawbridge which is part of the road. The toll road connects United States Highway No. 17, an interstate arterial highway, with Fort George Island, which lies off the northern coast of Florida, being separated from the mainland by the Intercoastal Waterway. The toll road crosses the Waterway at Sisters' Creek by means of the drawbridge which must be raised frequently to permit the passage of boats engaged in interstate commerce. The toll road constitutes an integral part of the highway system of the United States and provides the only means of land communication between Fort George Island and the Florida mainland. It is used extensively by persons and vehicles traveling between the island and points outside Florida in interstate commerce. Mail to and from other states as well as goods produced outside Florida and consigned to merchants on the island are transported over the toll road. Each of the petitioners was employed by respondent in connection with the operation of the toll road and drawbridge. Overstreet operated the drawbridge raising it for the passage of boats through Sisters' Creek and lowering it for the resumption of traffic over the road; Brazle was engaged in maintenance and repair work on the road and the bridge; and Garvin sold and collected toll tickets from 'vehicles using said toll road in interstate commerce'. Petitioners received neither the minimum wages nor the overtime compensation prescribed by §§ 6 and 7 of the Act.
We think these allegations bring petitioners within the coverage of the Act and entitle them to recover if proved.
Our starting point is respondent's concession that no question of constitutional power is involved, but only the ascertainment of Congressional intent, that is, did Congress mean to include employees such as petitioners within the Act. In arriving at that intent it must be remembered that Congress did not choose to exert its power to the full by regulating industries and occupations which affect interstate commerce. See A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522, 523, 62 S.Ct. 1116, 1119, 1120, 86 L.Ed. 1638; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 63 S.Ct. 332, 335, 87 L.Ed. --, decided January 18, 1943. Respondent contends that petitioners are in this category, that their activities are local and at most only affect commerce. But the policy of Congressional abnegation with respect to occupations affecting commerce is no reason for narrowly circumscribing the phrase 'engaged in commerce'. We said in the Jacksonville Paper Co. case, supra, 'It is clear that the purpose of the Act was to extend federal control in this field throughout the farthest reaches of the channels of interstate commerce'. And in determining what constitutes 'commerce' or 'engaged in commerce' we are guided by practical considerations. Jacksonville Paper Co. case, supra, and see also Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558, 36 S.Ct. 188, 189, 60 L.Ed. 436, L.R.A.1916C, 797, dealing with what will shortly be pointed out as a similar question in the coverage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.