Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting.
Far more important than the question whether nude dancing is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment are the dramatic changes in legal doctrine that the Court endorses today. Until now, the "secondary effects" of commercial enterprises featuring indecent entertainment have justified only the regulation of their location. For the first time, the Court has now held that such effects may justify [p. 318] the total suppression of protected speech. Indeed, the plurality opinion concludes that admittedly trivial advancements of a State's interests may provide the basis for censorship. The Court's commendable attempt to replace the fractured decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), with a single coherent rationale is strikingly unsuccessful; it is supported neither by precedent nor by persuasive reasoning.
I
As the preamble to Ordinance No. 75–1994 candidly acknowledges, the council of the city of Erie enacted the restriction at issue "for the purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the City." Ante, at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to the enactment of the ordinance, the dancers at Kandyland performed in the nude. As the Court recognizes, after its enactment they can perform precisely the same dances if they wear "pasties and G-strings." Ante, at 294; see also ante, at 313, n. 2 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In both instances, the erotic messages conveyed by the dancers to a willing audience are a form of expression protected by the First Amendment. Ante, at 289. Despite the similarity between the messages conveyed by the two forms of dance, they are not identical.
If we accept Chief Judge Posner's evaluation of this art form, see Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089–1104 (CA7 1990) (en banc), the difference between the two messages is significant. The plurality assumes, however, that the difference in the content of the message resulting from [p. 319] the mandated costume change is "de minimis." Ante, at 294. Although I suspect that the patrons of Kandyland are more likely to share Chief Judge Posner's view than the plurality's, for present purposes I shall accept the assumption that the difference in the message is small. The crucial point to remember, however, is that whether one views the difference as large or small, nude dancing still receives First Amendment protection, even if that protection lies only in the “outer ambit” of that Amendment. Ante, at 289. Erie's ordinance, therefore, burdens a message protected by the First Amendment. If one assumes that the same erotic message is conveyed by nude dancers as by those wearing miniscule costumes, one means of expressing that message is banned; if one assumes that the messages are different, one of those messages is banned. In either event, the ordinance is a total ban.
The plurality relies on the so-called "secondary effects" test to defend the ordinance. Ante, at 290–296. The present use of that rationale, however, finds no support whatsoever in our precedents. Never before have we approved the use of that doctrine to justify a total ban on protected First Amendment expression. On the contrary, we have been quite clear that the doctrine would not support that end.
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), we upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance that placed special restrictions on the location of motion picture theaters that exhibited "adult" movies. The "secondary effects" of the adult theaters on the neighborhoods where they were located—lower property values and increases in crime (especially prostitution) to name a few—justified the burden im- [p. 320] posed by the ordinance. Id., at 54, 71, and n. 34 (plurality opinion). Essential to our holding, however, was the fact that the ordinance was "nothing more than a limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited" and did not limit the size of the market in such speech. Id., at 71; see also id., at 61, 63, n. 18, 70, 71, n. 35. As Justice Powell emphasized in his concurrence:
"At most the impact of the ordinance on [the First Amendment] interests is incidental and minimal. Detroit has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship, and has imposed no limitation upon those who wish to view them. The ordinance is addressed only to the places at which this type of expression may be presented, a restriction that does not interfere with content. Nor is there any significant overall curtailment of adult movie presentations, or the opportunity for a message to reach an audience." Id., at 78–79.