Petitioner was convicted of wilfully attempting to defeat and evade his federal income taxes for the years 1936 and 1937. He was acquitted for 1935. Petitioner was a political leader in Atlantic City and Atlantic County, New Jersey. The prosecution's theory was that he had received large sums of money from those conducting the numbers game for protection against police interference and had not reported those sums in his income tax returns for 1935, 1936, and 1937. The defense was that his failure to return all the income he had received resulted from the mistaken but sincere belief that he was bound to return only the net balance remaining after deducting amounts expended for political purposes. The evidence was that one Weloff and one Towhey acting alternately delivered to petitioner on behalf of the numbers syndicate $1,200 a week from July 1935 to November 1937. About November 1, 1937, Weloff and Towhey were displaced by one Jack Southern to whom the syndicate delivered $1,200 a week. Neither the prosecution nor the defense would sponsor Southern's testimony. At the request of the prosecution the court called Southern as a witness. He testified that during November and December, 1937, he delivered the $1,200 a week to an inspector of police named Ferretti who was dead at the time of the trial. He denied that he ever made any weekly payments to petitioner. No evidence was adduced that petitioner received any sums from the syndicate during November or December, 1937. Petitioner took the stand and on direct examination admitted that he had received the weekly payments from Weloff and Towhey up to November, 1937. For 1937 these admitted payments totalled $50,400. Petitioner accounted for this sum by stating that he had reported $30,189.99 in his 1937 return as 'Other commissions' and that he had paid out the balance, roughly $21,000, as political contributions for that year. On cross-examination he denied that he had received payments from Southern during November and December, 1937. He was then asked 'Did you receive and money from numbers in 1938?' Counsel for the defense objected to the question on the ground that it was not relevant to the issue and would tend to prove a different offense than the one charged in the indictment. The court overruled the objection. Petitioner then answered the question in the affirmative. He was then asked, 'Who gave it to you?' Counsel for the defense objected. The court had the jury withdraw. The prosecutor asked that petitioner 'also be excused from the court room during the argument, and that when he resumes the stand he should do so without having any opportunity to hear what the argument is about'. The court said 'that is a fair request' and ordered petitioner to retire, which he did. No objection was made to that action. Counsel for the prosecution argued that the questions asked in cross-examination were proper to establish a continuous practice of receiving the numbers income throughout 1937. Counsel for the defense insisted that the cross-examination should be limited to the subjects opened up by the examination in chief. The court expressed the view that the cross-examination was permissible since it bore directly upon credibility. Counsel for the defense then pressed the point that even if it otherwise might be proper cross-examination, nevertheless it was 'improper cross-examination for the reason that it is directed to a future prosecution.' He asserted that he made the claim of privilege on behalf of the accused 'in view of the avowed threat of the government to prosecute him for the very years concerning which he is now asked to testify.' The court replied that it was for the accused, not his counsel, to make the claim and added, 'You may advise him of his rights, of course, but it is for him to determine whether or not he wishes to take advantage of them'. After further argument, the court stated:

'It seems to me that the testimony is perfectly relevant and material as cross examination directed to credibility.

Johnson v. United States (318 U.S. 189)/Opinion of the Court

'In view of the witness' testimony, unless it runs afoul of his right not to be required to incriminate himself, it seems to me that that is a right which he may waive or claim, and that that is a personal right that he may be advised by counsel when a question is asked, and that he will have to determine himself whether he is going to claim it or not.'

Johnson v. United States (318 U.S. 189)/Opinion of the Court

Petitioner resumed the stand. The question 'Who gave it to you?' was repeated. Counsel for petitioner then advised him of his constitutional privilege, which he thereupon claimed. The court ruled, 'You may decline to answer.' The prosecutor in his address to the jury commented at some length on petitioner's assertion of his constitutional privilege:

Johnson v. United States (318 U.S. 189)/Opinion of the Court