A relational contract is a contract whose effect is based upon a relationship of trust between the parties. The explicit terms of the contract are an outline implicit terms and understandings that determine the behaviour of the parties.

Ian Roderick Macneil Original Theory

Relational contract theory was originally developed in the United States by the legal scholars Ian Roderick Macneil and Stewart Macaulay. According to Macneil it offered a response to the so-called “The Death of Contract” school’s nihilistic argument that a contract was not a fit subject for study as a whole; each different type of contract (e.g., sales, employment, negotiable instruments) could be studied individually, but not “contracts-in-gross”.

Relational contract

Macneil explains that this is only one of a number of possible relational theories of contracts, and accordingly renamed his own version “essential contract theory”.

Relational contract

Relational contract theory is characterized by a view of contracts as relations rather than as discrete transactions (which, Macneil argued, traditional “classical” or "neo-classical contract" theory treats contracts as being). Thus, even a simple transaction can properly be understood as involving a wider social and economic context. For instance, if A purchases a packet of cigarettes from a shop he has never been into before and will never enter again, that seems quite discrete. However, A will almost certainly have a loyalty to a particular brand of cigarettes and expectations about quality about which he would be prepared to complain to the manufacturer, although he has no contractual privity with the manufacturer. There is also an understanding that A will pay for the cigarettes, not simply run off with them, and that if he tenders a £10 note in exchange for the cigarettes which are priced at £6, the paper money will be acceptable and change of £4 will be given. None of this is explicitly stated between the parties, whose conversation is likely limited to “20 Marlboro, please” on A’s part and “That’ll be £6, please” on the part of the retailer. Thus, even the simplest transaction has a good deal that is unstated and dependent on a wider web of social and economic relations. How far outwards into that web one needs to investigate will depend on the transaction and on the purpose for which it is being examined.

Relational contract

Incentives play a large roll in the efficacy of a relational contract. If there were no relational contract where future compensation, performance or plans are only promised and not guaranteed, then there is very little incentive to honour the deal and perform. However, with a relational contract parties have incentive to provide quality goods/services as part of an ongoing relationship of good faith that will be beneficial to both parties.

Although earlier writing may be taken in places to suggest that the substantive rules of contract law need to be reframed to acknowledge the relational, non-discrete nature of contracts, this has not been subsequently pursued and current scholars have argued that it is neither possible nor necessary to reform the law of contract itself to work effectively with relationally-constituted contracts.

Other characteristics of relational contract theory are that “contract” is understood to cover economic exchange in general, not just contracts that would be recognized as legally enforceable agreements by courts in any given jurisdiction, that relations are mostly held together by their own internal values and wider social/economic factors, and, at least in relational theory in the Macneil mold, that exchange relations are governed by a number of norms. This last is not to say that relational contract theory is normative in nature, setting out what ought to be the case properly, but rather that there are actual observable normal characteristics or factors at play in relations. Macneil’s essential contract theory offers some 14 norms. These norms are as follows: role integrity reciprocity implementation of planning effectuation of consent flexibility contractual solidarity the ‘linking norms’ the power norm propriety of means harmonisation with the social matrix enhancing discreteness and presentation preservation of the relation harmonisation of relational conflict supracontract norms.