A third, and perhaps a more important qualification than either, is--that a fleet is the only form of national force which can _never_ endanger national freedom.

On those _data_, the question of _national_ fleets is easily decided. England is not only the first naval power in the world, but she must _continue_ the first; because a fleet is _necessary_ to her existence, which _it is not_ to that of any other European throne. This is the dictate of nature, and is therefore a _law_. Other powers may possess a fleet as an appendage to their national strength, as suitable to their rank, or as adding to their means of hostilities. Still, to them, a fleet is not a _necessity_. Russia, France, and Spain have no more _necessity_ for a fleet, than Prussia, Austria, and Switzerland! But England, without a fleet, would be exposed to invasion on every point of a coast extending two thousand miles. Her wealth is all loose upon the ocean; her chief territories are all beyond the ocean: thus, _without_ a fleet, she would be almost wholly without the means of external defence, of retaliation for injuries, and of the commerce which is the most essential basis of her revenue. The result is, that, while the Continental kingdoms might be powerful states, yet not possess a ship on the seas, England, stript of her naval superiority, would instantly sink from her high position, would lose the larger portion of her power, would be separated from her most important colonies, would see her revenues decay,--and, if assailed by a foreign enemy, would see her resources suddenly stopped, and must prepare for the last extremities of struggle, hand to hand.

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In this view, we do not confine the question to the national fondness for the sea--to that mixture of boldness and skill which predominates in the character of our sailors, and forms the especial qualification of a sea-faring people,--nor to national superiority of any kind; but to the simple fact, that the possession of predominant power on the ocean _cannot_ be dispensed with by England, while it _can_ be dispensed with by every other power of the globe.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 64, No. 397, November 1848 — Part 107

There is also another reason for this supremacy; arising from the fact, that England may throw her whole national force into a navy; while other powers, however ambitious of naval eminence, _must_ at least divide their force between the land and sea services. France, with its immense frontier, must keep up an immense army during war. Russia, with a frontier from the Niemen to the North Pole, must keep up an immense army at all times. The maintenance of those armies is essential to the national existence, while the maintenance of a fleet is only gratifying to the national ambition. The consequence is as clear as a matter of arithmetic. France and Russia, attacking England separately, _must_ be ultimately beaten. America, even if she were a more formidable opponent than either, will also be beaten, and for the same reason. A fleet is not _essential_ to her; the undivided force of the States will never be applied to her navy. The national strength will be expanded over inland conquest; the sea-coast towns will be rapidly reduced to insignificance by the superiority of the great inland settlements; and the time will come, when the cities of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, will have no more weight with the inland powers of Louisiana and the prairies, than Brighton or Broadstairs have with the power of London. They will be watering places, or, at best, warehousing places, and will be no more able to keep up a navy, than the Isle of Thanet would be able to keep up the Channel fleet. All this, however, tends only to show, that a fleet is the supreme instrument of British dominion; and that its strength, its skill, and its discipline, should employ the utmost activity, liberality, and vigilance of every Cabinet which desires to do its duty to the empire.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 64, No. 397, November 1848 — Part 107