They lay principal stress on the defensive, and practically exclude the combat of larger 'Masses' altogether from their horizon.[28] In fact, they consider only the minimum conditions which the Cavalry must fulfil if it is not to fall into the background altogether.
[Footnote 28: Section 355, and note 357, 363, 365, 366.]
The final consequences of modern development, hardly even those resulting from the experiences of 1870-1871, they have emphatically not yet even approached.
Those who have studied the action of our Cavalry in that campaign thoroughly--as I myself had full opportunity of doing--will agree that we seldom had to have recourse to the carbine except on the offensive, as I have pointed out above, and only in the rarest cases did we need them for defensive purposes; and though in future against overwhelming forces this necessity may arise more frequently, still, as in 1870, this tendency towards a resolute offensive must always stand in the foreground. Nevertheless, the Regulations, in spite of all practical experience and theoretical considerations, lay down that in most cases fire action will be confined to the defensive (Cavalry Regulations, Section 357).
It is quite natural that the troops themselves should not place their ideal higher than the Regulations require; all the more necessary, therefore, do I hold it to express with all emphasis that _our training must go far beyond the limits prescribed for it officially_ if we are in any degree to satisfy the demands that War will make upon us. But for these, I hold our Cavalry thoroughly capable (when trained, understood), and even if they were not, one should never breathe such a suspicion to the men themselves. For should such an impression get abroad, one would dig at once the grave of initiative, daring, and resolution in the execution of all necessary undertakings.
Keenness, the very life and soul of all Cavalry action, can only grow where the troops believe themselves fully equal to all eventualities. The idea, therefore, that Cavalry, even when dismounted, is not equal to any Infantry, must never be allowed to show its head; rather, the men must be brought up in the conviction that, owing to their longer term of service, absence of reservists, etc., they are, unit for unit, more than a match for the best. Only when they feel this thoroughly will they develop their utmost fighting value. But it is indispensable that they should be thoroughly at home in all forms of the dismounted combat, for only then will they feel confidence in the weapons they carry.
