Some Names which require a particular Explanation 1
The Distinction between the Intellectual and Active Powers of the Human Mind 181
Causes of the Pleasurable and Painful Sensations 187
Ideas of the Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, and of the Causes of them 189
The Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, contemplated as passed, or future 196
The Causes of Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, contemplated as passed, or future 201
SECTION 1. The immediate Causes of Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, contemplated as passed, or as future 201
2. The Remote Causes of Pleasurable and Painful Sensations contemplated as passed, or future 206
SUB-SECT. 1. Wealth, Power, and Dignity, and their Contraries, contemplated as Causes of our Pleasures and Pains 207
2. Our Fellow-Creatures contemplated as Causes of our Pleasures and Pains 214
3. The Objects called Sublime and Beautiful, and their Contraries, contemplated as Causes of our Pleasures and Pains 230
SECTION 1. Pleasurable or Painful States, contemplated as the Consequents of our own Acts 256
2. Causes of our Pleasurable and Painful States, contemplated as the Consequents of our own Acts 265
The Acts of our Fellow-creatures, which are Causes of our Pains and Pleasures, contemplated as Consequents of our own Acts 280
"I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them." _Locke_, i. 1, 3.
PHILOSOPHICAL inquiries into the human mind have for their main, and ultimate object, the exposition of its more complex phenomena.
It is necessary, however, that the simple should be premised; because they are the elements of which the complex are formed; and because a distinct knowledge of the elements is indispensable to an accurate conception of that which is compounded of them.
The feelings which we have through the external senses are the most simple, at least the most familiar, of the mental phenomena. Hence the propriety of commencing with this class of our feelings. { 2}
"I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our organs, or any Ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or no. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon."--_Locke_, i. 1, 2.