And one being in itself, will also contain itself, and cannot be other than one, if in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.
But then, is not that which contains other than that which is contained? for the same whole cannot at once be affected actively and passively; and one will thus be no longer one, but two?
Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?
Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either rest or motion.
Why, because motion is either motion in place or change in self; these are the only kinds of motion.
And the one, when changed in itself, cannot possibly be any longer one.
And therefore cannot experience this sort of motion?
Can the motion of one, then, be in place?
But if one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another?
And that which moves round and round in the same place, must go round upon a centre; and that which goes round upon a centre must have other parts which move around the centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a centre?
But perhaps the motion of the one consists in going from one place to another?
And have we not already shown that one can not be in anything?
And still greater is the impossibility of one coming into being in anything?
Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, cannot as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor remain entirely out of it, if already coming into being in it.
And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and the one part may be in that other, and the other part out of it; but that which has no parts cannot possibly be at the same time a whole, which is either within or without anything.
And how can that which has neither parts, nor a whole, come into being anywhere either as a part or a whole? Is not that a still greater impossibility?
Then one does not change by a change of place, whether by going somewhere and coming into being in something; or again, by going round in the same place; or again, by change in itself?
The one, then, is incapable of any kind of motion?
But neither can the one exist in anything, as we affirm?