Because being in the same is being in something which is the same.
But it cannot be in itself, and cannot be in other?
[35] The text of Stallbaum (1848) does not harmonize with this. The version I quote leaves out ἐν, and reads τὸ αὐτό in the nominative.
And that which is never in the same has no rest, and stands not still?
One, then, as would seem, is neither standing still nor in motion?
Neither will one be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than itself, or other.
If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.
And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that upon this supposition, too, it would not have the nature of one, but would be other than one?
Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?
Neither will one be other than other, while it remains one; for not the one, but only the other, can be other of other, and nothing else.
Then not by virtue of being one, will one be other?
But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of being itself; and if not by virtue of being itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not be other of anything?
Neither will one be the same with itself.
Because the nature of the one is surely not the nature of the same.
Because when a thing becomes the same with anything, it does not necessarily become one.
That which becomes the same with the many necessarily becomes many and not one.
And yet, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing became the same, it would always become one; and when it became one, the same.
And, therefore, if one be the same with one, it is not one with one, and will therefore be one and also not one.
And therefore the one can neither be other of other, nor the same with one.
And thus one is neither the same, nor other, in relation to itself or other?
Neither will one be like or unlike itself or other.
Because likeness is sameness of affections.
And sameness has been shown to be a nature distinct from oneness?
But if one had any other affection than that of being one, it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one; and that is impossible.
Then one can never have the same affections either as another or as itself?