1. The appellant Fowler contends that, as no order was made at the term when the first decree was entered continuing until the succeeding term the motion and petition for rehearing, the decree of October 20, 1884, became final, and, consequently, the order at the June term, 1885 entered as of October 31, 1884, which granted a rehearing, as well as the decree January 11, 1887, are to be treated as improvidently made, or as nullities. We do not concur in this view. It is not disputed that if, in October, 1884, a rehearing was granted, and the clerk omitted to enter an order to that effect, it would have been within the power of the court, at the succeeding term, by an order nunc pro tunc to make the record speak the truth. But as the order granting a rehearing was entered under date of October 31, 1884, the presumption must be indulged, in support of the action of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, nothing to the contrary affirmatively appearing,-that the facts existed which justified its action; and, therefore, that the court granted the application for a rehearing at the term at which the first decree was rendered. Stockton v. Bishop, 4 How. 155, 167; Townsend v. Jemison, 7 How. 706, 718. Besides, the exception taken by the defendants to the proceedings of June 30, 1885, was not, in terms, that the order, then formally made, was directed to be entered as of October 31, 1884, but that it granted a rehearing. If they intended to deny that the rehearing had been in fact ordered at the previous term of the court, the point should have been distinctly made upon the record. sum due to sum person or corporation. contend that the contract of loan was a New York contract, and void under the laws of that state; and that neither the debt thus created, nor the mortgage given to secure the bonds, can be recognized, nor any recovery thereon had, in Illinois or elsewhere, for principal or interest. This contention rests upon the statute of New York, in force when the debt was created, providing that all bonds, bills, notes, assurances, conveyances, and all other contracts or securities whatsoever, whereupon or whereby there shall be reserved or taken, or secured, or agreed to be reserved or taken, any greater sum or greater value, for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action, than at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum, shall be void. 1 Rev. St. N. Y. pt. 2, c. 4, tit. 3, § 5; 2 Rev. St. (Banks & Bros.' 6th Ed.) 1164-1166. The suggestion that by the contract of loan a rate of interest was reserved in excess of that allowed by the laws of New York is based upon the ground that, although the bonds in suit call only for 7 per cent. interest, a much larger rate was in fact exacted and secured by the company, taking into consideration the amount of the loan, and the sum actually received, under the contract.
By the thirteenth section of a statute of Illinois in force on and after February 12, 1857, entitled 'An act to amend the interest laws of this state,' it was provided: 'Where any contract or loan shall be made in this state, or between citizens of this state and any other state or country, bearing interest at any rate which was or shall be lawful according to any law of the state of Illinois, it shall and may be lawful to make the amount of principal and interest of such contract or loan payable in any other state or territory of the United States, or in the city of London, england; and in all such cases such contract or loan shall be deemed and considered as governed by the laws of the state of Illinois, and shall not be affected by the laws of the state or country where the same shall be made payable.' Gross, St. Ill. 1869, p. 371, c. 54, § 13.