It is very natural and proper that this should be done. A mere obligation not to resort to war, without more, would almost imply that disputes between the parties to the obligation should { 15} find _some_ other method of settlement. For if some other method could not be found, feelings due to the continuance of the dispute might well arouse such passions in one country or another as to sweep away the obligation for peace. The two questions of the ending of war and the settlement of disputes between States are not only logically but realistically very closely related.
Disputes between States are often regarded as comprising those that relate to international questions and those that relate to domestic questions, the former being divided into justiciable and non-justiciable disputes.
I prefer, however, _for this discussion_, to classify possible international disputes in three kinds, namely:
1. Disputes as to international questions.
I am aware of the fact that such classification as the foregoing is overlapping. Disputes as to the _status quo_ will to some extent fall within the two classes first mentioned; they may relate therefore to questions which are international or which are domestic in their nature. However, I think the classification is justified, at least for reasons of convenience, and also, in my opinion, for reasons which go very much deeper.
Let me illustrate this by reference to questions arising from frontiers. The existence and the location of a frontier are essentially questions of international import. The location of a frontier may, in a given case, not only be an international question in the sense that it should be settled internationally, but also in the sense that it is justiciable, according to the usual idea of justiciable questions. This would be so in a case where the location of the frontier depended wholly upon the interpretation of a treaty between the two neighboring States.
But it is quite possible to imagine an international question regarding a frontier which is not in any way justiciable; such, { 16} for example, was the question as to where the frontier between Poland and Russia should be drawn after the World War.[4] That some frontier had to be drawn was obvious; but there was no possible legal basis for determining _where_ it should be drawn. The question was one of judgment, to be settled by agreement between the parties, if possible; or otherwise, if it was to be peacefully settled, by reference to some sort of tribunal which would decide according to principles[5] of equity, impossible to express in any precise legal formula. In other words, the question was an international political one.