Action, typical case of Cavalry, 225; example of Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
Advance, time to be selected for, 32; rate of, 121; of enemy marks period for pushing forward, 27
Advantages, in War, must be fought for, 29
Ammunition, carbine, insufficiency of, 175, 179; increase in amount of, for practice, 250
Ammunition columns, special, required for Cavalry, 179
Art of War, new conditions in, 3; their effect on Cavalry, 9; result of first engagement of overwhelming importance, 12
Artillery, effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods, 15; power of, can be over-estimated, 54; support of dismounted Cavalry by, 60, 100; protection of, 95; Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action, 100; position for, 101; one battery per brigade recommended, 179; quick-firing guns wanted, 180; should be attacked from flank, 234; co-operation in Cavalry training, 263
Attack, stereotyped forms of, prohibited, 72; on flank when advisable, 78; simultaneous, on front and flank, 79; 'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during, 91; by dismounted troops, 99; change of direction of, when permissible, 116; importance of vehemence of onslaught, 232; formation for, against Infantry and Artillery, 234; distribution and duties of dismounted men in, 259
Baggage-train should be represented at manoeuvres, 279
Battle-field, place of Cavalry in, 81, 84; case of Mars la Tour, 82; best formation for, 85; decided by circumstances of case, 82, 85; simple formations alone applicable on, 225; Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
Bridging material, sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with small streams, etc., 175
Brigade, highest unit for drill purposes, 238
Bugle calls, when allowable, 69; value of, 230; regimental calls, 230; movements to be practised without, 236
Cantonments, advantages of providing, 125
Carbine, method of attachment, 176; improved pattern needed, 177
Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass,' 7; during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878, 7; experiences of the past insufficient, 8; proportion to other Arms, 10; importance of, greater than formerly, 11; new tasks for, 14; actual fighting value diminished, 16; best strategic value increased, 16; public opinion at fault, 16; exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged, 16; German organization of, requires reform, 17; clear conception of requirements during each phase needed, 17; advance during mobilization deprecated, 23; should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins, 28; importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement, 31; in what cases the principal Arm, 37; Divisional, 38; Independent, 38; fire action of, during battles, 55; greater tactical cohesion than Infantry, 58; scope of, enormously increased, 59; importance of good leadership, 63; place of, in line of battle, 81, 84; formation of, on battle-field, 85; factors determining strategic employment of, 126; difficulty of supplying reinforcements, 151; augmentation of German, necessary, 153; and not to be postponed till mobilization, 158; training of, requires reforming, 181 _et seq._; Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs, 257; tasks for, in future War not properly appreciated, 268