The definition of cruelty accepted by the ecclesiastical courts as that of the canon law is the same as that which prevails at the present time; and the view of the law taken by the House of Lords in _Russell_ v. _Russell_ (1897 App. Cas. 395) was expressly based on the view of cruelty taken by the authorities of the ecclesiastical law. The best definition by older English writers is probably to be found in Clarke's _Praxis_ (p. 144): "Si maritus fuerit erga uxorem crudelis et ferax ac mortem comminatus et machinatus fuerit, vel eam inhumaniter verbis et verberibus tractaverit, et aliquando venenum loco potus paraverit vel aliquod simile commiserit, propter quod sine periculo vitae cum marito cohabitare aut obsequia conjugalia impendere non audeat ... consimili etiam causa competit viro contra mulierem." Lord Stowell, probably the greatest master of the civil and canon law who ever sat in an English court of justice, has in one of his most famous judgments (_Evans_ v. _Evans_, 1790, 1 Hagg. _Consist._ 35) echoed the above language in words often quoted, which have constituted the standard exposition of the law to the present day. "In the older cases," he said, "of this sort which I have had the opportunity of looking into, I have observed that the danger of life, limb or health is usually insisted as the ground upon which the court has proceeded to a separation. This doctrine has been repeatedly applied by the court in the cases which have been cited. The court has never been driven off this ground. It has always been jealous of the inconvenience of departing from it, and I have heard no one case cited in which the court has granted a divorce without proof given of a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt. I say an apprehension, because assuredly the court is not to wait till the hurt is actually done; but the apprehension must be reasonable: it must not be an apprehension arising from an exquisite and diseased sensibility of mind. Petty vexations applied to such a constitution of mind may certainly in time wear out the animal machine, but still they are not cases of legal relief; people must relieve themselves as well as they can by prudent resistance, by calling in the succours of religion and the consolation of friends; but the aid of courts is not to be resorted to in such cases with any effect." The risk of personal danger in cohabitation constituted, therefore, the foundation of legal cruelty. But this does not exclude such conduct as a course of persistent ill-treatment, though not amounting to personal violence, especially if such ill-treatment has in fact caused injury to health. But the person complaining must not be the author of his or her own wrong. If, accordingly, one of the spouses by his or her conduct is really the cause of the conduct complained of, recourse to the court would be had in vain, the true remedy lying in a reformation of the real cause of the disagreement.