If, within the meaning of the judiciary act of 1887-88 [24 Stat. at L. 552, chap. 373], the value of the matter in dispute exceeded the sum of $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs (25 Stat. at L. 433, chap. 866, U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 508), then there was no reason for dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction in the circuit court; for, diversity of citizenship was shown by the bill, and under the above act of March 3d, 1875, chap. 137 (18 Stat. at L. 470), it was competent for the circuit court, by a final decree, to remove any encumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to real or personal property within the district, as against persons not inhabitants thereof and not found therein, or who did not voluntarily appear in the suit.
The lands of which Hiram Evans died possessed were of the alleged value of $16,000, and we assume that the plaintiffs jointly owned one undivided half of them. Was the value of the joint interest of the plaintiffs in the lands in question to be deemed the value of the matter in dispute, or was the circuit court without jurisdiction if no one of the alleged fraudulent claims held by the defendants exceeded $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs?
Some light will be thrown upon this question by certain cases in which this court held it to be competent for a circuit court, in a suit in equity, to deprive parties of the benefit of a judgment or order fraudulently obtained by them in a state court.
In Johnson v. Waters, 111 U.S. 640, 667, 28 L. ed. 547, 556, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619, 634, the question was as to the authority of a circuit court to set aside as fraudulent and void certain sales made by a testamentary executor under the orders of a probate court. Conceding that the administration of the estate there in question properly belonged to the probate court, and that in a general sense its decisions were conclusive, especially upon parties, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for this court, said: 'But this is not universally true. The most solemn transactions and judgments may, at the instance of the parties, be set aside or rendered inoperative for fraud. The fact of being a party does not estop a person from obtaining in a court of equity relief against fraud. It is generally parties that are the victims of fraud. The court of chancery is always open to hear complaints against it, whether committed in pais or in or by means of judicial proceedings. In such cases the court does not act as a court of review, nor does it inquire into any irregularities or errors of proceeding in another court; but it will scrutinize the conduct of the parties; and, if it finds that they have been guilty of fraud in obtaining a judgment or decree, it will deprive them of the benefit of it, and of any inequitable advantage which they have derived under it.'