The statute under which the Indian, Jack Williams, secured his trust patent to the land here involved, was that of July 4, 1884 (chapter 180, 23 Stat. 96 (43 USCA § 190)), the pertinent part of section 1 of which is printed in the margin. Its purpose and effect were to extend to the Indian wards of the United States, subject, however, to the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, the privileges then enjoyed by citizens of the United States under the federal homestead laws. It was provided that patents issued to Indians for homestead lands under the act should, however, recite that the United States holds the land in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian for a period of 25 years, and that at the expiration of such period the United States would convey the same by final patent to the Indian or his widow and heirs in fee and discharged of the trust. The trust patent here issued to Williams conformed to these requirements of the law.
The first question certified to us by the Circuit Court of Appeals is whether, after an Indian had acquired a trust patent under the provisions of this statute, power remained in the Congress to extend, or to provide that the Executive, in his discretion, might extend, before its expiration and before there had come to be issued to the Indian a patent in fee, the period of the trust with its resulting restrictions on alienation. We do not think that our decisions leave any doubt, not only that it is within the power, but that it is the duty, of the Congress, where it finds conditions which warrant it, so to do. We have had frequent occasion to point out the duty of the United States to protect its wards, the Indians, and the consequent broad extent of its power over them and their affairs. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384, 6 S.C.t. 1109, 30 L. Ed. 228; United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 597, 36 S.C.t. 696, 60 L. Ed. 1192. There is nothing in the act of 1884 which indicates any disposition on the part of the United States to dispossess itself of its powers and duties as guardian, or so to change the status of its wards as to leave them no longer subject to manifestations of its protection. On the contrary, the provisions of the act leave no doubt that it is an act done by the United States in its capacity as guardian, and that the rights conferred by the act upon the Indians were so conferred principally because they were wards of the government. This is shown by the provisions exempting Indians from the payment of the usual fees, and by the provision respecting the form of the trust patent, and the restrictions on alienation.
This being so, we fail to find anything in the Act of June 21, 1906 (25 USCA § 391), which transcends the valid powers of the government over its wards. Passing, for the moment, the question whether the act of 1906 was intended to apply to Indian homesteaders claiming under the act of 1884, and assuming, for the purposes of question No. 1, that the word 'allottee' was intended to include such Indians, we find that the act provides:
'That prior to the expiration of the trust period of any Indian allottee to whom a trust or other patent containing restrictions upon alienation has been or shall be issued under any law or treaty the President may in his discretion continue such restrictions on alienation for such period as he may deem best. * * *' 25 USCA § 391.
This does not involve any question of an attempt to destroy vested rights. The power of the United States, delegated by the act to the President, is to be exercised prior to the issuance of final patent. It has been held that until final patent be issued no vested right is obtained by the Indian which would support a constitutional objection to the enlargement of the period of the restriction. See United States v. Allen (C. C. A.) 179 F. 13, 22, 23; United States v. Hemmer (D. C.) 195 F. 790.
What has here occurred is that the United States has conferred a privilege upon its wards-as such-and has surrounded its final acquisition with restrictions calculated to secure the advantage of the privilege to those intended to be benefited. Finding that the restrictions authorized at the time of the extension of the privilege will not, in all cases, be long continued enough to secure this result, Congress has authorized the Executive, in his discretion, to continue the restrictions for such period as he may deem best. That this is within the constitutional power of Congress must be considered as concluded by our decisions in Tiger v. Western Investment Company, 221 U.S. 286, 31 S.C.t. 578, 55 L. Ed. 738, Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 32 S.C.t. 424, 56 L. Ed. 820, and Brader v. James, 246 U.S. 88, 38 S.C.t. 285, 62 L. Ed. 591.