While numerous agencies have the capability for emergency communication within themselves, non-telephonic communication among entities and agencies in the affected area is minimal. This is true for Federal, State, and local agencies. This weakness has been pointed out repeatedly by earthquake response exercises, and the problem is raised by almost every emergency preparedness official at every level of government. Consequently, a major problem for resolution is the operational integration of communications systems and networks among the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies.

Because of their network-like character, most systems for transportation and water and power generation and distribution, as a whole, are resistant to failure, despite potentially severe local damage. These systems would suffer serious local outages, particularly in the first several days after the event, but would resume service over a few weeks to months. The principal difficulty would be the greatly increased need for these systems in the first few days after the event, when lifesaving activities would be paramount.

An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken — Part 6

Portions of the San Francisco Bay Area and of the Los Angeles Area contain substantial concentrations of manufacturing capacity for guided missiles and space vehicles, semiconductors, aircraft parts, electronic computing equipment, and airframes. Their specific vulnerability to the postulated earthquakes was not analyzed. In the event of major damage, however, the long-term impacts may be mitigated somewhat by such measures as the use of underutilized capacity located elsewhere, substitution of capacity from other industries, imports, use of other products, and drawing-down of inventories.

An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken — Part 6

Since we have not recently experienced a catastrophic earthquake in the United States, there are many unknowns which must be estimated with best judgment. This is true particularly for the response of individuals as well as governmental and other institutions. Popular assumptions of post-disaster behavior include antisocial behavior and the need for martial law, the breakdown of government institutions, and the requirement for the quick assertion of outside leadership and control. Practical experience and field studies of disasters, however, indicate that these assumptions are not necessarily correct. On the contrary, the impacts of the disaster commonly produce a sense of solidarity and cooperativeness among the survivors. Nonetheless, the perception remains among emergency response officials that there will be an increased need for law enforcement following the event.

An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken — Part 6