This is a proceeding in bankruptcy on objections to the allowance of petitioner's claim in bankruptcy based upon a money judgment acquired against the bankrupt before the bankruptcy. Respondents objected to allowance of the claim on the ground that, so far as here relevant, the judgment was procured by fraud, that is, by perjured allegations in the complaint in the suit in which the judgment was rendered, and by perjured testimony as to the value of property alleged to have been converted by the defendant.
The referee in bankruptcy disallowed the claim. On the referee's certificate the district court, sitting in bankruptcy, allowed the claim, sustaining petitioner's contention that the issue of fraud in procurement of the judgment had been previously litigated and decided in petitioner's favor in proceedings in which the petitioner and the bankrupt or his trustee, or both, had been parties, and was therefore res judicata.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 150 F.2d 869. Relying upon our decisions in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281, and Prudence Realization Corporation v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 62 S.Ct. 978, 86 L.Ed. 1293, it held that the court of bankruptcy could go behind the prior adjudications of the validity of the judgment and decide for itself the questions previously litigated and decided, whether the cause of action on which the judgment was entered was meritorious, and whether the claim in bankruptcy should be r jected because based on a judgment procured by claimant's fraud. The Court of Appeals accordingly remanded the cause to the district court for further proceedings on the objections to allowance of the claim. We granted certiorari, 66 S.Ct. 271, upon a petition which raises the questions whether the bankruptcy court may re-adjudicate the merits of a cause of action on which a judgment against the bankrupt, proved as a claim in bankruptcy, was entered and may disregard a previous adjudication between the parties that the judgment was not procured by fraud.
Woodruff, the bankrupt, was adjudicated as such on his voluntary petition on July 5, 1939. Petitioner, proceeding under § 63, sub. a(1), of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103, sub. a(1), 11 U.S.C.A. § 103, sub. a(1), which provides that a fixed liability, evidenced by a judgment, is a provable claim in bankruptcy, filed his proof of claim in the bankruptcy court upon a default judgment against Woodruff for the sum, including accrued interest and costs, of more than $278,000. The suit in which the judgment was procured was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California in July, 1935. Judgment was entered for petitioner on March 20, 1939, on proof taken of service of summons on January 31, 1939, and of Woodward's default and on evidence given by the petitioner.
The suit was based on diversity of citizenship, and the cause of action alleged was in substance that Woodruff had procured property of petitioner, consisting of rough sapphires, opals and zircons, of a stated value of $164,000, by false pretenses and false representations, the details of which are not now material, and had thereafter converted them to his own use.
On March 29, 1939, shortly after the judgment was rendered, Woodruff filed a motion in the trial court to set it aside. The motion, so far as it was based upon the alleged failure to serve the defendant Woodruff with process, was denied on June 8, 1939. But the court, on stipulation of the parties, directed that a hearing be held to determine the value of the converted gems and provided that at the hearing 'such competent evidence as either party desires to present be received' and considered by the court 'in determining the actual value of the property' which the plaintiff alleged was converted by defendants. The Court's order further provided that the judgment should be reduced in the amount by which the adjudged value of the gems exceeded the actual value as found at the hearing. After a contested hearing at which evidence, oral and documentary, was received, the trial court made a minute order stating that the court found that the values of the converted property were those alleged in the complaint, and declined to give further consideration to the motion to set aside the judgment. No appeal was taken from the judgment, and no review was had of the minute order or of the denial of the motion to set the judgment aside.