(1) By discriminatory export duties, or similar duties. In practice these are _not_ important.
(2) By discrimination in respect of prices, or similar matters, by _monopolistic_ producers. To achieve this result it is necessary not merely that one _State_ should have a "monopoly" of the supply of some raw materials, but also that _within_ that State, the production and sales of the raw materials should be in the hands of monopoly. Further, the domestic monopolistic organization, must, in order that discrimination should be an outcome of the situation, find it _profitable_ (not merely "patriotic") to discriminate in favor of the domestic market. There is _no_ important instance of such discrimination.
Such conjunction of circumstances is one which is exceedingly unlikely to occur. There is more chance that there will be discrimination _in favor of_ the foreign buyer. In short, the matter is not one of great practical importance, for
(1) a raw material supplied only by one State and (2) controlled, _within_ the State, by a monopoly, which also (3) finds it profitable to discriminate against foreign buyers
is something to be found only in imagination.
I venture to say that there has never been a time in modern civilization when the people of any country have been prevented by the international situation from obtaining any raw material whatever for which they had the capacity to pay. The only possible exception to this statement has been in time of war[15]; and the only possible change in the situation in time of peace would, as I have suggested, amount to some form of compulsory international charity.
If we look generally at this question of the _status quo_ from the international point of view during the past two centuries, we find two divergent and irreconcilable lines of treatment.
The jurists and the writers have generally considered that the _status quo_ is or ought to be sacred from the point of view of outside attack.[16] In most of the books the question is treated under the heading of "Intervention" and, perhaps with some qualifications, the writers do not admit the legality of intervention. They make exceptions on the ground of self preservation of the intervening State, sometimes on the ground of protection of human life and so on. But, at least with these exceptions, they generally maintain that the State against which the intervention is directed may legally object to it--that is, may legally insist upon the maintenance of the _status quo_ (or of its right, in a proper case, to change the _status quo_[17]) and furthermore that such a State might justly, if able (as it usually is not), resort to war against the intervention.