When Mehemet Ali had announced his intention of shaking off his allegiance, Mahmud had seemed to defer to the pacific counsels of the Powers, and had refrained from ordering his troops in Asia Minor to invade Syria. But, before the spring of 1839, it was clear that he was resolved to appeal to arms, and that all the efforts of diplomacy to prevent a renewal of the conflict would be fruitless. It was not alone his bitter hatred of his rebellious vassal which prompted the Sultan to disregard the advice of the ambassadors at Constantinople. His sole claim to the Khalifate rested upon the protection of Mecca, and, inasmuch as Mehemet Ali was in possession of the Holy Cities, were he to declare himself independent, Mahmud must forfeit his right to command the temporal obedience of Mohammedans. Already Constantinople was seething with disaffection, and he is said to have been aware that a plot had been formed to depose him and to enthrone his son, under the guardianship of Mehemet Ali.[472]
Mahmud was dying from a complication of disorders, but he gave his whole expiring strength to his military preparations. Men, horses and guns were hurried across the Bosphorus and forwarded to Hafiz Pasha in Asia Minor. Moltke with his plane-table was busily engaged in exploring the country up to Nezib, "a small town hidden among the olive trees close against the Syrian frontier."[473] At the news that the Porte was bent upon war, Mehemet Ali, curtailing his visit to Khartum, hastily returned to Cairo, whilst at Constantinople the ambassadors made a last endeavour to dissuade the Sultan from disturbing the peace.[474] But Mahmud was not to be diverted from his object, and in Paris, on May 23, 1839, it was known that Hafiz Pasha had crossed the Euphrates and that hostilities were about to begin.
French historians have generally imputed duplicity to the British government in this affair. Palmerston, they say, whilst pretending that he was anxious to dissuade the Sultan from war, was in point of fact allowing Lord Ponsonby, his agent at Constantinople, to encourage the Turkish ministers to break the peace. Ponsonby was unquestionably opposed to the policy of maintaining the _status quo_ in Syria. In his opinion Mehemet Ali was the sore which was sapping the strength of the Ottoman Empire, and, seeing that it was a British interest that Turkey should be in a condition to resist Russia, he held that England should assist the Sultan to crush his too-powerful vassal.[475] It is undeniable that Palmerston allowed him a liberty of action and of language which he would not have tolerated in any other ambassador. There can be no doubt, moreover, that he regarded the Egyptian question in very much the same light as Ponsonby. But he differed from him in one very important particular, inasmuch as he considered that the moment had not yet come when Mahmud could, with a reasonable chance of success, try conclusions with the Pasha. France, he was well aware, would never join in an attack upon Mehemet Ali. Indeed, it was rather a question whether she would not openly espouse his cause. The possibility of a combination between Russia and France could not be dismissed as a development outside the range of practical politics.[476] Hitherto, Nicholas' dislike of Louis Philippe had rendered the chance of such a contingency very remote. But, were England to adopt a separate policy in the east, it was improbable that the Tsar would allow his personal animosity to stand in the way of an alliance, which he might consider would serve the best interests of his Empire. Accordingly, when, at the close of the year 1838, Reshid Pasha, the _Reis-Effendi_, arrived upon a special mission to London, he discovered, to his disappointment, that Palmerston was not prepared to hold out any hopes that the British government would join in an attack upon Mehemet Ali. Only, Palmerston explained, in the event of the Pasha beginning hostilities, could England furnish the Sultan with naval assistance. Mahmud being intent upon war, a purely defensive alliance could be of no service to him, and was declined.[477] If the bellicose policy of the Sultan had received any encouragement from Lord Ponsonby, Reshid's conferences at the Foreign Office in London must have made it clear that the ambassador had been using language which he had no authority to employ. When, therefore, the Sultan ordered Hafiz Pasha to advance, he was perfectly aware that he was acting in opposition to the wishes of the British government, which did not believe that he had an army capable of defeating Ibrahim's Arab and Egyptian troops.