‘The further allegation of the prisoner,’ continued the public prosecutor, still harping on the petition, ‘that he never communicated his opinions to anyone, is manifestly false; for here we have had him saying that he should think he offended God did he not impart to others that which God had revealed to him. How shall we believe that, for the thirty years during which he has been engaged in elaborating and printing his horrible heresies, he has never communicated a word of them to anyone? Bethink ye, that he began at the age of twenty--an age when young people invariably communicate their views and opinions to one another, their friends and fellow-students--and by this judge of the kind of conscience the man puts into his answers with a view to abuse justice--as if he repented in any way of his horrible misdeeds! for though now saying that he is ready to submit to correction and ask pardon, he again and far oftener audaciously maintains that he has said nothing and done nothing amiss.’
Whether influenced by Calvin, to whose party in the State Rigot appears to have belonged, or involved in the suit, and believing it his duty to do all in his power to obtain the conviction of the prisoner, we see him now speaking as if he were intimately persuaded of Servetus’s culpability, and even looking on him as already condemned; hence the indignation with which he repels the petitioner’s request to have Counsel to assist him in his defence. This, indeed, was a demand that could by no means be granted without taking the case from the criminal category in which it had been placed by Calvin from the first. It is not so very long since the felon or the incriminated for felony among ourselves was denied the advantage of Counsel, and we are not to wonder at the same rule obtaining in the Republic of Geneva more than three hundred years ago.
Had Servetus succeeded in obtaining Counsel, he could not, by the laws of Geneva, have been dealt with capitally; and this would not have met the views of Calvin, it being impossible in his opinion adequately to punish the crime of which he held the man had been guilty by any infliction short of death. Rigot therefore became eloquent on the petitioner’s insolence, as he called it, in asking for Counsel to aid him in his defence. ‘Skilled in lying as he is,’ said M. Rigot, ‘there is no reason why he should now demand an advocate. Who is there indeed,’ he proceeds, ‘who would or who could consent to assist him in his impudent falsehoods and horrible propositions? It has not yet come to this that such seducers as he have been allowed to speak through Counsel; and then there is not a shadow of the simplicity that might seem to require assistance of the kind. Let him therefore be disabused of any hope he may have conceived that so impertinent a demand can for a moment be entertained, and ordered to reply by yea or nay to the further questions to be put to him.’ Rigot, we might fancy, must have thought that artful lying was a principal part of a counsel’s duties to his client.