Johan Birger Essen Dahlerus (6 February 1891, Stockholm – 8 March 1957, Stockholm) was a Swedish businessman, amateur diplomat and friend of Hermann Göring. He attempted through diplomatic channels to prevent the Second World War.
His futile diplomatic efforts during the days preceding the German invasion of Poland in 1939 are sometimes called the Dahlerus Mission.
Early life
Birger Dahlerus was born in Stockholm in 1891. He had an excellent network of contacts of authoritative Englishmen and various leaders of the Third Reich, such as his early acquaintance with Hermann Göring.
Only after the failure of his efforts would the British government bother to do a basic background check on him (on 23 October). The results were startling, as it emerged that his wife was a German national who owned considerable farm property in Germany. Furthermore, the British government was not aware that Göring had assisted Dahlerus in obtaining a marriage permit in 1934 or that Dahlerus had acted as guardian to Göring's stepson from his first marriage. Had those facts been known in advance, it is very likely that Dahlerus's services would not have been accepted by Britain, as his purported neutrality was greatly compromised.
Dahlerus Mission
It had been known to the senior military personnel of the Third Reich, at least since the Military Conference of 6 August 1939 at Obersalzberg, that aggressive war between Nazi Germany and the Western powers was imminent. On 7 August 1939, Dahlerus arranged a meeting at his own house, near the Danish border in Schleswig-Holstein, between Göring and seven British businessmen:
A. Holden
Charles Spencer
Stanley Rawson (John Brown & Company) Brian Mountain Sir Robert Renwick Charles Maclaren T. Mensforth
The businessmen attempted to persuade Göring that the British government would stand by its treaty obligations to Poland, which obliged it to support the Polish government in any conflict in which it became embroiled. Dahlerus believed that they had succeeded.
At the Nuremberg trials, the British prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, was able to persuade the Swede that he had been badly misled by the German leaders, and that the discussion had no effect on the policy and actions of the Third Reich.
On 25 August 1939, the British and the Polish governments converted the unilateral declaration of support offered by the British government into a mutual assistance pact. On the same day, Benito Mussolini wrote to Hitler to indicate that he would declare war on the Western Powers immediately. Dahlerus then was acting as an intermediary between Göring and British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax. Göring had summoned Dahlerus from Stockholm on the previous day, put him on an aircraft and dispatched him to inform the British government that Germany wanted an understanding with Britain. Halifax informed him that diplomatic channels were open and that his input was unnecessary.
Following a telephone conversation between him and Göring, Dahlerus had a further conversation with Halifax on 26 August. He persuaded Halifax to write a letter, couched in nonspecific terms, indicating the desire of the British government for peace and requesting a few days' leeway in which to achieve it.
On 27 August, Dahlerus flew to London and met Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Horace Wilson and Sir Alexander Cadogan. He presented an offer, which included a proposal that Britain would agree to Germany offering to guarantee the borders of Poland, taking Danzig and a allowing referendum in the Polish corridor. The very modest proposal was nevertheless felt to be unacceptable, and the Poles would fight rather than agree to it. It was agreed that Dahlerus would return to Berlin and report with Hitler's reply. Dahlerus had become so significant, according to his own testimony, that he felt able to advise the British government that it should keep Ambassador Nevile Henderson in London until the next day so that he could better react to Hitler's response.
On 29 August, at a meeting with the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Henderson had been presented with a document containing 16 points that Germany demanded agreement by Poland. Henderson said that they were spoken too quickly for him to understand and that he was denied a written copy. On the following day, Dahlerus was given a copy of the 16 points by Göring and took them to Henderson, who dispatched him to Polish Ambassador Józef Lipski, who had never heard of Dahlerus. As one of the 16 points was that a Polish negotiator with full plenipotentiary powers should appear in Berlin before 1 September, the Polish government deemed the proposals unreasonable.