Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum is a secret document. But as the English and American Press have already printed long passages from it, it is practically possible to give it in its entirety without adding anything to what has already been printed.
M. Tardieu has published M. Clemenceau's reply, drawn up by M. Tardieu himself and representing the French point of view:
The French Government is in complete agreement with the general purpose of Mr. Lloyd George's Note: to make a lasting peace, and for that reason a just peace.
But, on the other hand, it does not think that this principle, which is its own, really leads to the conclusions arrived at in the Note in question.
The Note suggests that the territorial conditions laid down for Germany in Europe shall be moderate in order that she may not feel deeply embittered after peace.
The method would be sound if the recent War had been nothing but a European war for Germany; but that is not the case.
Previous to the War Germany was a great world Power whose _future was on the sea_. This was the power of which she was so inordinately proud. For the loss of this world power she will never be consoled.
The Allies have taken from her--or are going to take from her--without being deterred by fear of her resentment, all her colonies, all her ships of war, a great part of her commercial fleet (as reparations), the foreign markets which she controlled.
That is the worst blow that could be inflicted on her, and it is suggested that she can be pacified by some improvements in territorial conditions. That is a pure illusion. The remedy is not big enough for the thing it is to cure.
If there is any desire, for general reasons, to give Germany some satisfaction, it must not be sought in Europe. Such help will be vain as long as Germany has lost her world policy.
To pacify her (if there is any interest in so doing) she must have satisfaction given her in colonies, in ships, in commercial expansion. The Note of March 26 thinks of nothing but satisfaction in European territory.
Mr. Lloyd George fears that unduly severe territorial conditions imposed on Germany will play into the hands of Bolshevism. Is there not cause for fear, on the other hand, that the method he suggests will have that very result?