I think we have proved that the attendant conditions of the two cases differ widely. If the Regulations had but taken them into consideration, the difference between the two methods of attack would have thereby been made more intelligible to all officers from the first than could be done by general instructions of this nature.
The cavalry has now a demand made upon it by Regulation which, although it can be met on the drill-ground, will be impossible of fulfilment in war. It will therefore be necessary to discard in war what we have taken such pains to learn, a thing which frequently happens in manoeuvres, and even on the exercise-ground.
In the formation for attack and the deployment, the Regulations follow the logical sequence of their point of view that, in the attack upon cavalry, no second line is necessary, and in this matter adhere to the directions laid down in the old Regulations. From my point of view, this does not seem to correspond at all with the necessities of the fight.
In my "Reflections on the New Cavalry Drill Regulations" I laid down "that it should always be possible for cavalry to change from the manoeuvre column straightway into attack formation with flank protection, without first forming line, as hitherto has been deemed necessary." In opposition to the Regulations I still hold fast to this principle.
We have seen that the formation in lines is the necessary one for _all_ charges, and that an attack in _one_ line will only be possible in exceptional cases where weakness forbids the formation of several lines, or where the surprised and demoralised condition of the enemy appears to render a second line superfluous.
The logical conclusions resulting from these reflections are that all column formations employed in the approach march must keep in view first and foremost the rapid adoption of the attack formation, and that deployment must in principle lead to the formation in lines for attack. The complete deployment in line of any units from the regiment upwards can only be necessary in exceptional cases. It can be formed from the attack formation or direct from column when specially ordered.
Taking into consideration the rapidity with which approach, deployment, and attack will often follow each other, I would even advocate that a trumpet-call, "_Form for attack!_" should be laid down in the Regulations. The strength of the various lines will generally have to be ordered according as the objective consists of cavalry or troops using fire action. It will not always be possible to find time for detailed arrangements, particularly during the rapid vicissitudes of a cavalry combat. The trumpet-call would then justify itself, and the lines would be formed by the independent action of squadron leaders, according to the formation the troops were in and the expected breadth of frontage of the enemy. It should be laid down as a guide that of four squadrons one at least should form a second line, and that an unprotected flank should, when possible, be covered by a squadron in échelon. The squadrons nearest the enemy would form a first line, and the remainder would act according to circumstances, and either follow the first line, échelon themselves in rear of it, or, when necessary, prolong it. For the deployment into one line a special call could be used.